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Draft Recommendation
on the situqtion in centrsl Asia and the Caucasus and European security
The Assembll',
O Recalhng problems raised follorving the break-up of the Soviet Union, by the appearance of
eight nerv independent states m central Asia and the Caucasus rvhrch are attempting to define their role
and find their place in relation to one another and the maJor powers around them;
(u) Stressing the need to help these states in the diffrcult tasks of stabilising therr rntemal srtuation
and establishing democratic and plurahst structures based on a flourishing econom)', whrle at the same
trme taking their characteristic ethruc, cultural and religious diversity into account,
0r,) Recalling also the principle of the inviolability of the borders of those countries, many of rvhich
u,ere the outcome of arbitrary decisions taken at the time by the Soviet authortttes s'ithout any care as to
u,hethcr they, corresponded to the ethnic, hnguistic and cultural reality of the regrons in question,
(w) Notrng u'ith constemation that crvil war continues to rage in Afghanrstan apparently without
any real desire on the part of the parties to the conflict to seck a peaceful solutton b1' opening negotia-
trons.
(v) Welcoming the peace settlement putting an end to the conflict in Tajikistan but fearing that the
exclusion of certain intcrestcd parties from that settlement, the presence of forces involved rn the Afghan
war on Talikrstan soil and the ambrguity of the role of Russran forces rn that countn'mav give rise to
further tensron that could rock the stability of neighbouring countnes such as Uzbekrstan and Kir-
ghrzstan.
(w) Supportrng the peace plan drari.n up by'the OSCE's Minsk Group to find a peaccful, Iasting and
fair solution u'rth regard to the future status of the province of Nagorno-Karabakh.
(vtr) Wishrng also that the plans for a peaceful, politrcal settlement of the conflrct rn Abkhazra should
be successfullv rmplemented as qurckll, as possible to the satrsfactron of all the partles concerned,
(wt) Convinced that peacekeeping mrssions to crrsrs flashpornts m central Asra and thc Caucasus
should be entrusted to multinatronal forces. not exclusivelv recruted from the Russtan armv or the
armies of the CIS member countrres.
0x) Desirous that the rn,aln,betrveen certain countnes of the region u'herc cach rs seekmg to be rec-
ognrsed as a maJor regronal power, rvrll qurckly give rvay' to a sprnt of cooperatron and solidarrty on the
basrs of cquallrv among all countnes urthm the nerghbourhood.
(x) Noting that a large number of forergn firms and po\\'ers are engaged m cut-throat compctrtion to
explort the natural rvealth of the depths and coastal surrounds of thc Caspran Sea and that the coastal
states. rn partrcular Kazakhstan. Turkmenrstan and Azerbarlan, arc thus exposed to ail kinds of pres-
sures from countnes compctrng for profits from cxploitation of such resources.
(n) Desrrous that an equrtable internatronal arrangement, negottated tn conlunctton u'tth all inter-
ested countrrcs and companres. ivrll put an end to "the prpelinc uar".
(xn) Notrng s,rth concern that pcrsrstent tensron bctu'een the Unrtcd Statcs and Iran is leadrng to the
development of a Moscorv-Tehran axrs. the rmphcations of uhrch are causing uncasc to scveral
countnes of thc rcgron in qucstron-
(nu) Concemed also b1' the support of certam countrrcs for the Tairban forces rn Afghanistan rvhose
advance could thrcaten the stability of several of its central Asian nerghbours,
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(xiv) Earnestly hoping that the policy being conducted by' Kazakhstan to find its place, while main-
tarning its independence vis-a-vis its powerful neighbours, will be successful,
(xu) Desirous that the Energy Charter Treaty draun up by the European Union should be the touch-
paper for a more coherent overall European policy tou,ards the countries of the region and that the EU
should make efforts to iron out ccrtain differences betrveen Europe and the Unrted States as to the policv
to be pursued rn the region,
(xri) Convinced that WEU, several member countries of which are involved rn the exploitation of the
natural resources of the Caspian Sea region, has a responsibility to contribute, u'ithin the framervork of
its area of responsibilitl', to crisis prevention and to the pacification of all crisrs flashpoints of the
reglon,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CO1JNCIL
1. Study to what extent WEU might contribute, at the request of the OSCE, to mamtairung peace in
crisis flashpoints such as Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly once the parties havc agreed to accept the
first stage of the peace plan drawn up by the Minsk Group,
2. Studythe possibrlity forWEUmember countries to help certain countrics of the region upgrade
their mrlitary equipment and trarn their armed forces for the purpose of strengthenrng their defence and
independence and in the interest of maintarnrng peace;
3 Launch an initiative vts-a-vrs the LIN Security Council in support of Uzbekistan's proposal to
convene, under UN auspices, a peace conference on Afghanistan and estabhsh "a contact group" to
include all partres to the conflict and the United States and Russia;
4. Support in addition the plan to convene an mternational peace conference, under United Nations
ausprces and ri'ith OSCE rnvolvement, to discuss the conflrct in Abkhazia:
5. Take initiatives withm the CFSP framervork to enter into dialogue rvith the United States to iron
out any differences of vrcu's that exist on some aspects of policy tou'ards central Asia and the
Caucasus:
6 Support. u'ith the European Union. ever1, effort to enable central Asra and the Caucasus to
become a flounshrng, stable and peaceful rcgron, mter alia by promotrng regronal cooperatlon,
7 . Enter into regular political dralogue rvith the erght neu, independent statcs of the region for that
purpose.
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Explanatory Memorandu m
(submitted by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur
and Mr Akgali, co-Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. Europe's interest in the developments rn
central Asia and the Caucasus is of recent date,
havrng emerged since the birth of eight nes' inde-
pendent states situated betrveen the Black Sea
and the Chinese borderr. AII of them used to be
part of the former Sovret Union and are now
members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). Until the-break up of the Soviet
Uruon most of them had never genulnelv knoun
independence
2 Because of rts geostrategic positron, vast
natural resources, ethnic drversity and variety of
cultural and religious traditions, the entre Cau-
casus and central Asian region rs of considerable
interest to the major powers bordering upon it
and especially to Russia, to rvhrch most of the
nervll' rndependent countnes belonged before the
l9l7 revolutron. Man1, regional conflicts have
broken out m these areas and equitable solutions
to some of them have not yet been found. The
power struggles during the l9th century betrveen
Russia and Great Brrtain are no\\' a thing of the
past and the number of other powers taking an
interest rn thrs part of the u,orld has consrderabll,
rncreased smce the dissolution of the Soviet
Union.
3. Without hsting them comprehensively,
mention mrght be madc of the Unrted States,
Turkel', Iran. Chrna, Pakrstan and several Euro-
pean Unron member countrles, including France,
Germant' and the Unrted Kmgdom, rvhrle rnter-
natronal organisatrons such as the OSCE, NATO
the United Nations, the Councrl of Europe and
the European Union have begun to devote part of
their polrtrcal actrvrtv to the countnes of central
Asia and thc Caucasus Wcstcrn European
Union. rvhrch has responsibrlrty for sccurity and
defence matters. has so far merelt' kcpt a rvatch-
ful if increasrnglv rnterested e1'e on thc sltuatlon.
but u'ithout taking anv practrcal actron.
I Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Talikistan, Krrghizstan
and Turkmenrstan ln central Asra, and Armenra,
Azerbaijan and Georgra rn the Caucasus
4. The WEU Council has thus made several
statements on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in
support of the attempts madc by the OSCE to
arrive at a peaceful settlement of the conflrct. In
its document European Secttrity: a Jotnt contn-
bufion by the 27 WEU countnesz, adopted in
November 1995, the WEU Councrl devoted a
special chapter to Europe's u,orld economic in-
terests, rvhrch noted, tnter aha, thal'.
"Most European countries are largely de-
pendent for their supplies of energy and
rarv materials on countries ll,hose polrtical
and economrc stabrlrtl, over the medium
term cannot be taken for granted Gas and
orl are convel'ed, at least in part, through
pipehnes crossing countries of uncertam
stabilrty In the event of a major crisrs, the
disruptron of those supphes rs a distrnct
probabrlrtl' and mantrme transport routes
could be r.tlnerable. The flon, of gas and
oil to European markets through reliable
pipehne and mantime routes hold great
political and strategrc sigruficance "
As far as the Caucasus and the countnes of cen-
tral Asra are concerned, the Councrl stressed that
rt u,as in Europe's intcrest to encouragc fruitful
cooperatron rvith the countries of thc regron and
to ensure that an1' conflicts that divided rt u'ere
settled by peaceful mcans. according to the pnn-
ciples dcfined b1'the Unrted Natrons Charter and
by the OSCE. The Councrl furthermore con-
firmed lts support for sovereigntv and rnde-
pendence for all CIS mcmber statcs
5. Hou'ever WEU has not as vet studied horv
rt might translate the above assessments lnto a
concrete pohcv on central Asra and the Caucasus
and the Polrtrcal Committee therefore decided to
devote an rn-depth report to the sub.;ect
6 The Polrtrcal Commrttee set up a Sub-
commrttee to prcpare rts report The Subcom-
mrttee vrsited three countnes in the region -
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekrstan 
- 
during
the first half of October of thrs year The dis-
cusslons that took place behi'een Subcommtttee
2 Asscmbll'Document l-t93. 20 November 1995
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mcmbers and man), parliamentar), and govern-
ment representatrves of the countnes concerned
yielded a wealth of information, strengthenrng the
conviction of those who took part in the visit that
Europe, and WEU in particular, should hence-
forth devote a great deal more thought to the
significance of this part of the rvorld
II. Geographic and historicol background
to the region
1. Central Asia
7. In geographic terms, Asia can be drvidcd
into tu'o reglons: one, dominated by China, rvhich
includes Mongoha, Tibet and Gansu and
Xrnlrang provinces; the other, belongrng to the
Commonrvealth of Independent States (CIS) 
- 
in
other ivords the former USSR repubhcs of
Uzbekrstan. Turkmenistan, Tajrkistan, Kirghiz-
stan and Kazakhstan Betg'een the tu'o blocs he
Mongolia, Afghanrstan and the eastern part of
Iran known as Khorasan.
8 The terrrtorics of central Asia are pecuhar
in that thev are landlocked and essentially either
steppe lands. and desert (Gobi, Takla Makan) or
red (Kizil Kum), uhrte (Ak Kum) or black (Kara
Kum) sands Manv rivers dissect the regron: the
Yenrser to the north rvhich flou's down from the
Altar Mountarns, to the north-east the abundant
h1'drologrcal svstem that feeds the Amur and
Lake Barkal. to the south-east the upper u'aters
of the Huang Ho (Yellon' Rrver); to the rvest the
nvers rising rn the Tran Shan and the Pamrrs
feedrng the Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash. thc Ih.
the Chu. the Talas. the Syr Dar1,a, thc Zerav-
shan. thc Jhelum. the Amu Darya (2 540 km), the
Tarrm (2 179 km) flou.s through Xrn;rang
9 Central Asra ls a reglon esscntrallr' domi-
nated bv mountarns the Altar, the Tran Shan, the
Pamrrs and the Hrndu Kush. Thcse take the form
of massrfs. punctuated rvrth plateaux (Mongoha,
Dzungana) or n\,'cr r.'alle1's (Tanm) Travel rs
drfficult vla mountaln passcs at altttudes of over
4 000 metrcs or corrrdors causcd br. Iand subsr-
dence (for cxamplc the fault hnc that hnks thc
Turfan dcprcssron to Urumqr)
l0 Vegetatron rs generally very, sparsc (out-
side the nver vallevs) Precrprtation r,.arres bct-
u'een 100 mm per )'ear ln the Gobr descrt and
u'estcrn Gansu, 200 mm rn Upper Trbct, the
Srstan and the Tarrm basrn as far as the \\cstern
Gansu, rn the foothills of Turkmenistan, and
I 500 mm in Lhasa province on the summits of
the Hindu Kush.
I I The eastern regrons of Kazakhstan (total
area2 715 000 km2) include the steppes of Faim
(Bek Pak Dala) and mountainous arcas as far as
the Lake Balkhash basin (340 m) turning into
semi-desert tou,ards the coast of the Aral Sea
The loiv-lf ing parts of the area (rarel,v hrgher
than 100 m) are inhabited by nomadrc peoples.
Kazakhstan's borders total l2 012 km: I 533
shared u'ith Chrna. l05l ri'ith Kirghrzstan, 6 846
rvith Russra, 379 u,ith Turkmenistan and 2 203
with Uzbekistan Thc countrl' also borders on
the Aral (l 015 km) and the Caspian (l 894 km)
Seas It has abundant natural resourccs or1,
coal, manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, molyb-
denum, lead. zmc, bauxite, gold, uranium, lron
and chromrum. Kazakhstan rs a country rvrth
severe environmental problems Radroactrve and
toxic drscharge has bcen detected the Icngth and
breadth of the countn,, usualll' on formcr mrh-
tan, srtes Some torrns have high levcls of indus-
trial pollutron In addrtron to all this rs thc prob-
lem that the Aral Sea rs drying up as a result of
its tr,vo marn fceder nvers berng drvertcd for rrrr-
gation purposcs
12. lJzbehstan (449 000 kmz) rs formed of a
succession of dcserts and fertrle vallel's trar,'erscd
bv several mountaln rangcs To the u'cst. thc
countr)' rs drarned b1'the Amu Darva u'hich oncc
flou'ed into the Aral Sca The regron ls r1o\\' rn
thc proccss of becomrng desertified follourng the
intensrvc demand on its \\'ater resources Thc
fertrle Zeravshan vallev lies to the centre and cast
and rs the srte of ma;or settlement At rts castern
end hc the fertrle. scll-drarned foothrlls of thc
Tcrmez and Tashkent ranges The Fcrghana
vallc1,, a nft vallo' 300 km long and 100 km
urde. supports man), flourrshing l'ino'ards. or-
chards and gardcns Uzbekrstan's borders lvrth
rts nerghbours total 6 221 km rn lcngth. L37
shared rvrth Afghanrstan. 2 203 rvrth Kazakhstan,
I 099 rvrth Krrghrzstan, I I6l urth Tajikrstan
and I 62i urth Turkmenlstan Thc countn' also
has srgnrficant deposrts of the follorung natural
resourccs natural gas. oil. gold, uranrum, srh,cr.
copper. lead. zrnc. tungstcn and moll'bdcnum In
envlronmcntal terms. nsmg pcstlcide and natural
salt conccntratrons have led to the dr1 rng up and
descrttficatron of thc Aral Sca Water pollutron
due to rndustrral cfflucnt and heall usc of
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fertihscrs and pesticides are at the root of a
number of health problcms and soil salination
and contamination by agrochemrcals (including
DDT)
13 Turkmentstan (448000 km2) is almost
exclusrvelv desert or semr-desert (Kara Kum)
The onl1, fcrtrle regions are thc Kopek Dag
foothills and the oases that are the sources of
rivers (Tcdzhen, Murghab and Amu Darya).
The principal consequence of modern irrigation
methods has been the drying up of the Aral Sea.
14. Talthstan (143 000 km2) and Kirghizstan
(128 000 km2) arc pastoral regions ri'ith virtually
no agrrculture other than on the mountain slopes
and in the feu, existing vallel's Talikistan has
lrttlc cultivable land above 2 000 mctres. Kir-
ghizstan consists of a serres of mountam ranges
(4 000-7 000 m) drssected by, valleys and of the
closed basin of the Issl'k Kul.
15 Afghanistan (650 000 km2) consists of a
successron of high parallel chams (5 000-
7 000 m) nsing to the east of thc Pamirs and
Karakorum, separated by thc high peneplains of
the Wakhan (4 000 m). The terrain falls away to
the n'cst, urth valleys at a lou'er altitude
(2 500 m) and summrts at herghts belou
4 000 m To the east the descent from the high
Kabulistan plateau (1 800 m) overlookrng India
is through the 50 km or so of the Khvber Pass,
ri'hrch. at rts hrghcst point. reaches an altitude of
I 280 m To thc north the lou, plarns of Afghan
Turkestan (500-800 m on average) stretch to the
Amu Darya hnkrng rt ruth rvestern Russran Tur-
kestan The regron enJo)'s mrld srnters and hot
surrrmers and consrsts marnlv of steppes covered
u'rth scrub The south-n'est of the country is
drarned bv the Ststan, u'hose lou--lf ing and and
strflrng basrn hes at an altrtude of 500 m or less
),6. Wrth the exception of Ta.lrkistan, the
changeovcr to independence \\'as relatrveli' peace-
ful for thc ccntral Asran countnes u'hrch had
been part of the former Sol'ret Unron, owmg to
the vast drstances separatlng them from thc
centres of Sot'rct po\\'er. Thcse countnes hal'e
alu'a1's cnjoi'cd more freedom ln managrng therr
o\\n lntemal affarrs Russran cxpanslon into the
area began rn the mrd-l8th ccntun'. at a tlmc
u'hen anarchv uas rrfe, wrth thc Russran van-
guard provrdrng protection for thc Kazakh
Khans; hou'ever thc Russran cmplrc had ven,
linlc interest rn thc regron Bv thc end of the
l9th century it had effectrvely conquered the en-
tire area, to u'ard off possible expansion of the
Britrsh empire from India and to ensure border
stability in the south of the emplre. Russia and
the central Asran region establishcd considerable
economic hnks but Russra drd not interfere very
much with local rnstrtutions
17. The region underu'ent major social change
under Soviet dominatron. Signrficant progress
rvas made in thc fields of public health, education
and infrastructure Hou'ever, such economlc
changes rvere pard for dcarlr', as was the case in
the countrres of the Caucuses. For example, col-
lectivisatron led to thc death of almost two mil-
lion Kazakhs, in othcr rvords nearly 40% of the
Kazakh population, bctu'een 1930 and 1939
18 Even more rmportant than promoting eco-
nomic devclopment, thc Soviet reglme gavc pri-
oritl' to the need to create natronal identitics rn
the regron At the turn of the last century, the
peoples of central Asia identrfied themselves
either as members of local groups or tribes or as
members of a particular Mushm community. No
group had a sense of national rdentitl,: Uzbek.
Kazakh or Krrghrz. Feanng the emergence of a
strong pan-Turkr or Mushm idcntrtl'u'hich could
be used to mobrhse the peoples of central Asia
against Moscos'. the Soviets conducted a policl'
of drvide and rule through the creatton of national
identitres in central Asra In 1924, Moscow dr-
vidcd central Asra into fir'e repubhcs u'hich. for
the first trme rn thc rcgion's hrstory. *'cre ethni-
cally' defined Dralccts u'ere chosen and clevated
to natronal languagcs. each usrng a drfferent
Cynllic scnpt A natronal history sas rnl'cnted
for cach repubhc and the ne\\. natlonal rdcntrtl,
attrrbutcd lts o\\n hrstoncal figure (for example,
Tamburlarne rn Uzbekistan) These natronal rden-
trtrcs u'crc also strengthencd b1'the creatron of
speciahst natronaI economlcs
2. The Cqucasus
19 Thc countrres of the Caucasus (Armenra.
Azerbar.lan. Gcorgra) are lockcd rn bv three rc-
gronal po\\'ers. Iran. Russra and Turkev and b1
two seas. the Black Sea and the Caspran Sea
Bccausc of its strategrc locatron. thc region has,
throughout hrstory'. bcen a baltlcficld for the
empircs of the regron (Achacmenrd. Greek. Ro-
man. Parthran. Bvzantrne. Arab, Mongol. Otto-
man, Persian. Russran) Despite thc fact that
dorvn the ages. thc peoplcs of the Caucasus oftcn
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found themselves under the srvay of pou,erful
empires, these countries have a strong sense of
natronal identity and a hrstory that can be traced
back through many centunes. The Georgians
and Armenians take great pride in their conver-
sion to Christranity and religious identrty.
20. Russran settlement bcgan in the mid-l6th
centurl' u,hcn the reglon u'as divrded up bets'een
the Persian and Ottoman emprres It took Russia
three centuries to impose total control over the
area. Russian annexed Georgia in I80l and,
after beatrng off the Ottomans and Pcrsrans,
seized Azerbailan in l8l3 and took control of
Armenia in 1828.
21. The Russian presence u'as initially u'el-
comed on account of the protectron it brought
agalnst the Persrans and Ottomans. Hou'ever the
Russran occupation retarned its repressivc char-
acter untrl 1845, u'hen measures x'ere relaxed
somexhat. Thrs perrod sau' the brrth of succes-
srve emancipatron movements.
22 During the Russian revolutron, Armenra,
Georgia and Azerbagan rejected Bolshevism and
agreed to create a republic of the Transcaucasus
The union lasted onll' five u'ecks and the three
countnes garned rndrvidual tndependence Fol-
lorung bnef periods of occupatron by' the Turks,
Germans and British after the first rvorld rvar. thc
Red Armt' took control of thc Caucasus in I92 I
23 Armenia, Azerbaryan and Georgia \\,cre
admrnrstered as a federatron bv the Sovrets until
1936. s'hen thev becamc rcpubhcs There u'as
controvers]' over the process of estabhshrng therr
borders The Nakhrchevan and Nagorno-Kara-
bakh regrons \\'ere assrgned to Azerba4an al-
though Nakhrcher,'an rs completelt' surrounded by
Armerua and the populatron of Nagorno-Kara-
bakh rs preponderantlr Armenian
24 Nevertheless the creatron of these states on
the basrs of ethnrcrtv strengthencd Armenia and
Georgra's nattonal rdentrtres As thc Azeris had
aluavs been close to the Tartars and the Turks,
their natronal rdentrtv emerged Dunng thc
Sovret occupatron. the Armcnran. Gcorgran and
Azen natronal tongues werc glvcn specral status
and the pcoples of those repubhcs \\'ere among
thc best-educated rn the USSR. Although it con-
ferrcd advantages upon them, the USSR dcs-
trol'ed other aspects of communrtl, lrfe In par-
trcular lt sct rts facc against all the rnitratr'"'es
taken in the 1920s b1'the countries of the Cauca-
sus to mtroduce the Latrn alphabet as the offrcial
script As in other regrons of the USSR, collec-
trvisation met u'ith armed oppositron. The purges
there u'ere no less sevcrc in sprte of Stalin's
Caucasian origrns.
25 With thc coming of Perestroika in 1986.
thc countnes of the reglon sau' therr opportunity
to exact further autonomy, Georgra quicklv lard
claim to sovcrolgn status and Armenia to the
Nagorno-Karabakh region These demands
brought an explosion of vrolence rn their wake
26. The Armenian campaign in Nagorno-
Karabakh to unite the enclave rvith Armenia led
to confrontation in 1988, follorved bl,antr-Arme-
nlan demonstrations rn Azerbagan. In April
1989, rn Tbrlisi, Georgran natronalists responded
to Abkhazr agitators demandrng greater auton-
om1, bv staging a demonstration. This initially
anti-Abkhazi demonstratron soon took on the
flavour of an rndcpendence rallv and was
quashed by'the Sovret armv The Sovrets rvere
also responsrblc for the violent break-up of a
demonstratron rn Baku rn Januan' 1990 Thcse
rncrdents strengthened the countn,'s determina-
tion to speed up the rndependencc process The
hand of Moscou' u'as automatrcalll assumed to
be at u'ork ln an\/ separatlst movement rn thosc
countrles In all of them nationahst forces as-
sumed po\\'er after the farled Mosco\\r coup ln
l99l The exrstrng power structures establishcd
by the Russians collapscd. leadrng to instabrlrty'
and intcrnal po\\'er struggles
IlL Destahilisution factors and risks
in the region
27 Apart from thc civrl \\'ar in Afghanrstan,
cthnrc and rehgrous conflrct has crther brokcn
out. or rs threatenrng to do so. both rn the nerv
rcpubhcs of ccntral Asra and the Caucasus and
even on Russran Federatron. Chrnese and Iranran
sorl Moreover. Turker'. Iraq. Iran and S1,ria arc
all affectcd b,v thc Kurdrsh problem
I. Tajikisian and Afghanistun
28 Ta.;rkrstan dcclared rndcpcndence on 9
Septcmbcr 1991. in 1992 a, chaotrc and ex-
trcmclv bloody' crvrl u'ar brokc out rn the coun-
tn,, strll torn bv rrvalnes betu'cen oppostng clans
Desprtc thc presencc of somc 25 000 Russran
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soldiers, u'ho had entered the country b1, rvay of
Uzbekistan, the death toll rose to approximatell,
100 0003 rvhile some 600 000 refugees fled the
country. In late 1992, the victorious popular
front mrlitia had set up a pro-Russian regime in
Dushanbe, under Mr Rakhmanov, the country's
currcnt President. Lrke manv other opponents of
the regime, Mr Nun, the leader of the Islamist
forces had to flee to north Afghanistan, from
rvhence he organised political and military
resistance to the Dushanbe regime
29. On27 June 1997, after approximately five
years of civil strife, a peace treaty was signed
behveen President Rakhmanov and the head of
the united opposition, Mr Nuri. Russia, con-
cerned by, the recent gains made in Afghanrstan
by' the Tahban movement, regarded as an Isla-
mist threat to neighbouring countries, \\'as all the
more anxrous to achreve a settlement of thc con-
flict In the opinions of some commentators.
Moscou' is mainly seeking all-round acceptance
b1' all the countr.r"s political forces. and hence
consohdatron, of a lasting Russian military pres-
ence in Tajikistan as a factor for stabrlit1,4. It
should be recalled that the Russran troops are
there in the guise of a lornt CIS peace force and
that thcir mandate does not cover intervention in
internal conflrct rvithrn Ta.;rkrstan5. The realrtr',
hou'ever. is that thev served to protect the instal-
Iatron of the neo-communist regime of President
Rakhmanov
30 But a settlement was also in Iran's inter-
ests. as rts people are closelv related to the
Ta.liks Several Talik oppositron members took
refuge in Tehran. Horvcvcr, smce 9 August
1997. nerv mrlrtary skirmishes have broken out
near Dushanbe and the ceasefire rs still not en-
trrelv secure
3l The problem of findrng a peaceful and
lasting solutron to the conflict in Talikrstan rs of
partrcular interest to Uzbekistan and the matter
u'as drscussed rn some detarl during thc Sub-
commrttec's vrsrt to Tashkent Uzbekistan is
concerned. tnter aha- about being marginahsed
as a result of the dcvelopment of a Moscou'-
3 Estrmates pubhshed rn thc ,Veue Zurcher Zettung,
21 lune 199'/
' \'eue Zurcher Zettuttg, 27 lune 199'7 .
s I-e 
-\Iontle.l3 August I997
Tehran axis, which in its view is already produc-
ing effects in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
32 Thus the Uzbek Deputy Foreign Minrster,
in his talks rvith the Subcommittee on 9 October
last, stressed the ver1, close "cohabitation" be-
trveen Uzbekistan and Tajikistan According to
him, some 600 000 Tajiks live in Uzbekistan and
a large number of Uzbeks have made their home
in Tajrkistan, In some border districts, villages
have mixed populatrons Uzbekistan. rvhich ex-
pressed a u'ish to be involved in a peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict rn Tajikistan (and in Af-
ghanistan), especrally as regards the rights of
refugees to return to therr home country, did not
take kindly to the fact that such settlement \\'as
achieved wrthout rts rnvolvement.
33. He takes the vierv that any peaceful solu-
tron should involve all the parties to the conflict
and that Uzbekistan could take a leading role in
bringrng stability to the region. Accordrng to the
thesrs of a specialist in the French Foreign Minrs-
tr1,6, the peace agreement in Tajikistan betrvcen
the (supposedly pro-Iranian) Gharmrs and (pro-
Russian) Kulakis, ivhrch excludes the Lenibadis
tribe (close to Tashkent), has lent credence rn
Tashkent to the idca that Moscorv and Tehran
are seekmg to engineer the formation of a Greater
Talrkrstan
34. As far as recent developments in the
seven-)'ear old crvrl \\'ar rn Afghanistan are con-
cerned, Uzbekrstan rs not the only countn' on its
borders to fear the consequences for develop-
ments in Ta.yikistan and rts ou,n securitl' of a
Tahban victory. Hou'cvcr, of partrcularll' sen-
ous concern rs the fact that none of the belhger-
ents seem prepared to srt doun at the negotratrng
table Thc Tajrk commandcr. Shah Massoud,
appcars to bc the onll'uarlord of any'rmportancc
to continue to offer anv resrstance to thc Tahban
offensive, despite the recent return of the ethnrc
Uzbck leader, General Abdul Rashrd Dostom.
former warlord of northem Afghanistan There
rs no drsagrcement rn pnnciple betu'een Russta
and Uzbekrstan over the danger represented by
thc Tahban forces' progrcss tou'ards Ta.likistan's
borders Horvcvcr Uzbeks do not approve of
u Olirrcr Ro1' Ltzbehstan'sforergn polrcv put to the
test' beb+,een,lloscott ontl the'faltban in the
Bullettn du Cenlre d'analyse ct de prdvrston, No 69,
Sprrng-Summer, 199'7.
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Massoud's forces being stationed m Tajikistan
with Russian agreement, as they, feel thrs could
Iead to ethnic conflict rvithin Tajikistan u'ith a
ricochet effect that might draw rn Tashkent.
35. During talks held with members of the
Political Committee Subcommittee, Mr Ismailov,
Uzbekistan's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
reiterated the country's official position with re-
gard to settlement of the Afghan conflict. Thls
was as follorvs:
first, mamtenance of Afghanistan's terri-
torial integrrty;
second, rejection of military means as a
rvay, of settling the conflict;
third, cessatron of all interference in the
countrl,'s domestrc affairs,
fourth, a stnct embargo should be imposed
on arrns supplies to the area of conflict;
fifth, particrpation of all the main forces
involved in the conflrct in a step-by-step
peace process, u'rth a vierv to forming a
coalition government on the basis of vvide
representation;
srxth, the establishment under UN aus-
pices of a process of peaceful discussion in
ivhich the Islamic Conference would also
partrcrpate:
the formatron for this purpose of a contact
group made up of representatrves of
countnes u,ith a cofirmon border with Af-
ghanrstan. the Unrted States, Russra and
representatrves of opposing forces rvrthin
Afghanrstan.
According to the Mrnrster, the Unrted States and
Pakistan should cease supportrng the Taliban and
the Russians should rvithdrau' therr support for
General Massoud. Hou,ever lt ls not eas), at
present to see u,hat rncentives mrght brrng the
belligerents and external pou'ers mvolved rn the
conflict to the ncgotratrng tablc
2. The Chinese province of Xinjiang
36 The Chrnese provrncc of Xinjiang has a
major problem u'rth rts non-Chrnese minoritres
(Kazakhs, U1'gurs and Krrghiz) The autono-
mous regron of Xrn;rang Uygur, formerly known
as Chrnese Turkestan, rvith an area of
530 000 km2, rs the sixth largest of the Peoplc's
Republic of China, but u,ith a population of only
l5 million or so, 607o of u'hom are Muslim It rs
situated in the immediate vicinitl, of Kazakhstan
37 . In the early 1980s. China's policies to-
wards Xinliang U1,gur u,erc modcrate; rt released
its grip on the Muslim majority, mosques were
reopened and Mushm u'orship rvas tolerated de-
sprte the overtll' anti-religrous stance of the local
governmcnt. Hou,ever, disturbanccs recurred in
the late 1980s urth a series of incidents Ieading
to a number of deaths The Chinese authorities
u'ere sruft to act to repress this form of "local
nationahsm".
38. According to press reportsT, Berjing ap-
pears to havc leaned even more heavily on the
Uygur separatists in Xinjiang province belonging
to the Turkish-speakrng and Muslim communitl,
there. The same sources refer to the presencc of
several pro-U1'gur indcpendencc organisations in
Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan. including the Unitcd
National Revolutronary' Front (tNRI) u'hrch
advocated armed struggle agalnst Chrna for
Uygur independence Hou'ever dunng thc course
of the Subcommrttee's vrsrt to Alma-Ata in
October 1997, none of its Kazakh contacts men-
tioned the exrstence of anv senous drfficultres
betu'een Chrna and Kazakhstan arising out of
Mushm separatlst tendencres in Xrnjrang prov-
rncc On the contran,. thev hrghhghted progress
ln stable relatrons betu'een Kazakhstan and
Chrna and thcrr desire for mcreased economic
cooperatron bets'een the tu'o countries
3. The conJlicts in the Caucasus
and Nagorno-Karabakh
39 Nagorno-Karabakh. prrncrpallv inhabrted
by Armenrans, became part of Azerbar.;an rn the
1920s as a result of a decrsron taken b1' Stahn
The conflrct bet'iveen Azerbarlan and Armenra
over Nagorno-Karabakh began rn Februan' 1988
u'hen the Armcruan conmunltv of Nagorno-
Karabakh demonstrated rn favour of berng ab-
sorbed rnto Armenia Azerr rcfugees in Sumgart
then unleashed a pogrom against the Armenrans
The conflrct uorscncd follorvrng the break-up of
the Sovret Unron Outrrght hostilities began on 8
May' 1992 u'ith a hghtnrng attack b), Armenians
against Nagorno-Karabakh. rvhrch they pro-
l0
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ceeded to occup)' along rvith other Azerbarjan
territones.
40. The ceasefire in the disputcd region has
held since Ma1' 1994 The Nagorno-Karabakh
and six other admrnistrative districts of Azerbai-
jan (in other rvords 20% of its territory) are ef-
fectively undcr the control of Karabakh troops
The Lachin corndor links the tu'o repubhcs rvtth
Armenra Armcnia dcnies the presence of its
armed forces on Azeri sorl. Despite one or tu'o
skirmishes along the frontJine betrveen Azeri and
Armenian troops, the military sttuation tn general
can be descnbed as static. At its Budapest
summit in December 1994 the OSCE decided to
launch a peacekceping operation in Nagomo-
Karabakh, but difficultl' u'as encountered on
reachmg a political agreement betrveen the par-
tres on a cessation of hostilities. Negotiations
resumed in 1995 under the aegis of the OSCE's
Mrnsk Group, but urthout yieldrng the hoped-for
result. The stumbling-blocks related to refugees,
the status of the ternton', restitutron of occupied
areas, the blockade b1' Armenra and that of the
enclave, and security guarantees for Nagorno-
Karabakh.
41 As Nagorno-Karabakh did not lvant the
partrcs that effectivell' guaranteed rts security to
u'ithdrau', it made clear that it ri'ould onll' agree
to xrthdrau,al of rts troops from occupted terri-
ton, rn return for definitron of rts status This
rdea of a trade-off betrveen status and exchange
of terntory u'as relected b1' Azerbagan How-
ever in late 1995 Azerbagan took a softer line,
u'hen Presrdent Alivev referred to the possrbilrty
of rarsmg Nagomo-Karabakh's status as needtng
to be accompanied bv recognttton of Azerbat-
Jan's soverergntv over thc terrrtory The coun-
tr1"s neu' constttutron grves the Nachrchevan re-
gron the status of a statc ri'ithin Azerbarlan and a
srmilar form of u'ords mrght possrbli' be found
for Nagorno-Karabakh
42. The problem of settling thc confltct rn
Nagorno-Karabakh obviousll' loomed large rn the
talks bcts'ecn the vanous Azen authonties and
thc Subcommrttee durrng the latter's vtsit to
Baku on 14 and 15 October 1997 The vtstt
occurred at a partrcularlv rnterestmg ;uncture as
the Subcommrttec was able to meet Mr Alil'ev on
the same da1' as thc French Head of State. Mr
Chirac, was havrng talks u'rth Mr Ter-Pctrossian.
Presrdent of Armenra. tn Parts
43. Thc Presrdent of Azerbarlan appeared
fairly' optimrstrc that a solution could be found
rvrth the help of the OSCE's Minsk Group, on
the basis of the principles drau,n up dunng the
OSCE Summrt held in Lisbon on 2-3 December
1996 It should be remembered, horvever, that
those attending that summit rvere not able to
reach agreement on the text of the paragraph in
the Lisbon Declaration relating to settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This u'as the
reason for the Chairmanshrp-in-Office of the
OSCE publishing the principles for such settle-
ment at Lisbon, rvhere they'u,ere accepted by all
the participants rvith the exception of Armenia
44. The text states
"Three prrncrplcs lvhich should form part
of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflrct \\'ere recomlnended by the co-
Charrmen of thc Mrnsk Group. These
princrples are supported bl' all member
states of the Mrnsk Group. Thel'are.
terntorial integrrty of the Repubhc of
Armcnra and the Azerbagan Repubhc,
- 
legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh de-
fined in an agreement based on self-
determination u'htch confers on Na-
gorno-Karabakh the highest degrce of
self-rule u'rthm Azerbarjan;
guaranteed securitv for Nagorno-Kara-
bakh and tts uhole populatron, rnclud-
rng mutual obligatrons to ensure com-
phance bv all the parties u'ith the pro-
vlslons of thc settlement
I regrct that one parttclpatlng state could
not accept thrs These prtncrplcs have thc
support ofall other partrcipatrng states "
45 The Armcnran Delegatron rejorned bv tssu-
ing the follourng Dcclaratron
.' l The statement does not reflcct either
the spint or the letter of the Mrnsk
Group's mandate as estabhshed by thc
Budapest Summit I994, rl'hich proposed
negottattons utth a vterv to reachtng a pol-
rtrcal agrccment The problcm of status
has been a sub.;cct of dtscussron tn dtrect
ll
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negotiatrons which have yet to be con-
cluded
2 The statement predetermrnes thc
status of Nagorno-Karabakh, contradicting
the dccision of the OSCE Ministerial
Councrl of 1992, rvhrch referred thrs issue
to the competence of the OSCE Mrnsk
Confcrence. to be convened after the con-
clusion of a polrtical agreement
3. The Armenian side is convrnced that
a solution ofthe problem can be found on
the basis of international larv and the
principles laid doun in the Helsinkr Frnal
Act, above all on the basis of the pnncrple
of sclf-determination.
4. In the mterests of reaching a com-
promise solution, the Armenran srde rs
prepared to continuc u'ith thc most inten-
sive negotratrons, both rvithrn the Minsk
Group and on the basrs of dircct contacts
coordinated b1, the co-Charrmen of that
Group."
46. In his address to the Councrl of Europc
Summrt held in Strasbourg on 1l October 1997,
the Presrdent of Azerbarlan confirmed, rnter alru,
the follourng
''We support the recent proposal put for-
u'ard b1' the co-Charrmen of thc Minsk
Group of the OSCE 
- 
Russia. thc Unrted
States and France 
- 
for a settlement of the
conflict ln t$'o phases the first phase to
conslst of the g'rthdrarval of Armenian
armed uruts from the six occupred admrn-
rstrative reglons of Azerbarlan. guaranteed
return of refugees to therr homc areas and
re-instatement of all communlcatlons sev-
ered on account of the rvar, the second of
settlement of the question of the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. together urth thc hb-
eration of the admrnistratrve regions of
Lachrn and Shusha"
47 In an rntervreu' rvrth Le MondeE, the Ar-
menlan Presrdcnt. Mr Ter-Petrosslan- made clear
that the first stage of the Mrnsk Group proposal
also included deplolment of an OSCE buffer
force and, in a statement which contradrcted the
Azen President's statemcnt rn Strasbourg, as-
serted that Azerbarlan as rvell as Armcnra had
rejected the contcnts of thc second phase pro-
posed by the Mrnsk Group
48. He confirmed. hou,ever. that the first part
of thc plan had been acccpted b1' both countnes
and that the mcdrators had deferred drscussron of
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh untrl a later
date, after the first phase had been implemented
49 Accordrng to the Armenian President.
Azerbar.yan and Armenra had reached agrccment
on acceptmg the first-phase prrnctples as a basis
of negotratron, but Nagorno-Karabakh had not
1,et made any reph' He said that he had arrrved
at the conclusron that anv demand for full rnde-
pendence or for the absorytron of Nagomo-
Karabakh into Armenia u'as not feasrblc and that
the onll' solutron u'as to find a compromise by,
reconciling the pnnciple of terntorial rntegration
supported by' Azerbarlan u-ith the Armenian
pcople's nght to self determinatrone
50. The attrtude adopted b1' thc Armenian
Presrdent at the Strasbourg summrt received a
\\'arrn receptron from the Subcommrttee's Azerr
contacts, durrng the Subcommrttee's vrsrt to
Baku. Although thc Mrnister rcsponsible for
national secuntl' did not specrficallv enlarge
upon the sccond phase of the future status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Presrdent Alrver,'s special
advtser made clear that Azerbauan \\as prcparcd
to grant Nagorno-Karabakh full nghts of auton-
om1' othcr than rn regard to rcsponsrbrlrtv for
forergn pohcl'and dcfence and thc rrght to intro-
duce its o\\n currcncv A furthcr conccrn on the
part of Azerbarlan rn connectron u'rth Nagorno-
Karabakh related to Russia's ren' closc rclatron-
ship u,rth Armcnra. partlcularh' as rcgards mrh-
tary matters At the Turkrsh Atlantrc Councrl's
Erghth Internatronal Conference on Securrtv and
Coopcratron, held rn Antall'a on 25-28 Septem-
bcr 1997. thc first Vice-Presrdent of thc Azerbar-
.1an Parhament supphed the follox'rng rnforma-
tron
'-Aftcr srgning ur 1994 the Agrcement on
Ceascfirc. thc mrlrtan potentlal of Ar-
menra bcgan to lncrease rntensivell' Rus-
sra, u'hrch rs co-Charrman of the OSCE
12
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Minsk Group on peaceful settlement of the
conflrct through the Minrstry of Defence of
the Russian Federation rllegallv supplied
to Armenia a lot of armoured techrucs,
ammunrtion including mrssrle sets R-17
and "Igla", antr-aircraft systems "Krug"
and "Osa", tanks T-72 and BMP-2. hou,-
itzers D-39, D-20 and D-1, reactrve instal-
lations ''GRAD", many mortars, weapons,
machrne-guns and other types Armenia
has long-distance (300 km) missrle sets
and u'ell-knoun Scud sets u'rth the cap-
acrtv to carry means for nuclear atLacks.
These missiles can fully destroy an!'
populated area of Azcrbarjan and other
pa(s of the regron. The total amount of
thrs mrlitary assistancc is approxrmately
US$ I brllion Obvioush,thrs enlargement
of mrlrtary potential of Armerua is not of
dcfcnce character. It shorrs thc aggressive
pohcv of Armerua which is threatening for
contrnguous states and for Turkev as u'ell.
A serrous danger for peace and stabrlrtl' in
the region represents Trea['on Friendship,
Cooperatron and Mutual Assistance bct-
ueen the Russian Federalon and Armerua
srgned on 29 August 1997 rn Moscorv
Thrs Treatv provrdes for
- 
estabhshment of Armenran-Russian
loint mrlrtan' productron and Jomt
financrng for milrtary prograrnmes: 1n-
crease of milrtarv actrons in thc regron
of conflrct and imbalance of forces m
far our of Armenia,
- 
mutual usagc of mrlitan' ob.;ects and
cqulpmgnt and also lornt usage of de-
fcnce ob.;ects uhrch means a drrcct
thrcat to our sccunt1,.''
-51 Durrng the course of the Subcommrttcc's
talks u'rth Azerbagan's Forergn Mrnistcr. Mr
Hassanor'. rn Baku on 14 Octobcr 1997. the
Mrnrster refcrred rn vcn, general terms to Azer-
bar.;an's conccrn or.'er the der,'elopment of mrlrtan'
coopcration betucen Russra and Armcnra. and rts
ob.;ectn'cs. the more so in viov of the surround-
ing contcxt of closer trcs betrrecn Russra and
Iran Hou'ever. he noted that the purposc of Mr
Primakor"s reccnt l'rsit to Baku had been to rcas-
sure the Azcrr govcmment that Russra's alhancc
uith Armenra \\'as not drrccted agamst Azcrbar-
Jan
52. In March 1997, Azerbaryan's Foreign
Minister had been rnformed that thc Russian De-
fence Mmrstcr had confirmed delivery to Arme-
nia. rvrthout government authorisatron. of certain
pieces of mrhtary equipment and that an enquiry
had becn opencd On 2 Apnl 1997. the Chairman
of the Defencc Commrttec of the Duma, Mr
Rokhlin, had admrttcd that rllegal shrpments of
Russian mrlitary cquipment had becn sent to Ar-
menra between 1993 and 1996 and had requested
that an official enquiry be carned out b1,the
pubhc prosecutor's offi ce
53. As far as settlement of the Nagorno-Kara-
bakh drspute was concemed, a particular prob-
lem that u'ould arisc u'hen it came to making a
decrsion about thc compositron of the buffer
force to be deplol'ed in the regron under OSCE
ausplces n'as that it rvas likelv that Azerbarlan
n'ould totalll' reject thc presence of Russran
troops on rts terrrtorl, A second drfficulty would
be decrdrng whethcr thc peacekeepmg force
should be made up cntirell' of CIS member
statcs During talks betueen thc Subcommrttee
and members of the Azerbar.yan parliament. it
u,as evrdent that the Azcrrs do not regard the CIS
as ncutral urth regard to Nagorno-Karabakh.
The drfficultr for the West, and rn particular
WEU and the NATO countncs. u'ill hc rn decid-
ing uhcthcr and to u'hat extent thev are prcpared
to contnbute actn'elv to such a peacckeeping
force
-54. To round off the hst of factors hable to
have a dcstabrhsrng cffect on thc region around
Azerbar.lan. rt is rvorth remembcrrng that thc Az-
en people number some 27 mrlhon. onl1, 7 mrl-
hon of u'hom hve rn Azcrbaryan rtself Some 20
mrlhon or so are resrdents of the Tabnz region of
Iran Both countnes fear that thc Azcri com-
munrtres nrght seek rcunrficatron rn a singlc
statc There are even calls in Iran for Azerbai-
jan. formerh' a part of Iran. to be returned to the
latterro
55 Lastlr'. rt should not be forgotten that
north of Azcrbar.lan. more preclsell thc Russian
provlnce of Dagcstan. rs homc to thc Lczghians
s'ho arc akrn to thc Azerr pcople Accordrng to
informatron supphcd bv the Azerr Mmrstcr for
Natronal Sccuntr. Azerbarlan seems to have
bccn thc target srnce thc carll 1990s of a number
l3
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of terrorist attacks orchestrated from thrs neigh-
bourrng distnct, posstbly rn collusron ruth Mos-
cow.
4. Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia (Georgia)
56 Efforts to settlc the conflicts in Abkhazia
and Southern Ossetia have focuscd on the status
of thcse regions of Gcorgra. Presrdent Shevard-
nadze, u,hrle insisting that an1' constitutronal re-
gime to be set up rn Georgia should take account
of the country's terntorial rntegrity', agreed that
they should have a substantial degree of auton-
omy Abkhazia u'ould therefore have its oun
constrtution, with Abkhaz as the official lan-
guage (alongside Georgran), its olrn emblems of
statehood and rts o\\n government, lcgal and
judrcral svstems Southern Ossetia u'ould have
its oun charter However the nerv Constitution
adoptcd by the Georgian Parliament on 24
August 1995 makes no reference to the relation-
shrp ii'ith these territorres
57 Abkhazra achieved de facto independcnt
statehood rn September 1993. after separatist
fighters repelled Georgran government troops
sent there n 1992 follorvrng the declaration of
rndependence Abkhazia chose not to demand
full rndependence offrcrally. but to seek a confed-
erate svstem based on recognltlon of rts sover-
ergntv and the estabhshment of a flexrble
(slmbohc) unron betu'een thc tu,o countrics as
equal partners.
58 Representatrvcs of the Gcorgran Govern-
ment and the rebel region conducted negotratrons
throughout 1995 under Russran auspices Russra,
accuscd of supportrng the separatrsts at the start
of the conflict, drex' closer to Mr Shevardnadzc,
uho u.anted to reJorn the CIS. and agrecd to de-
plovment of Russran armcd forces rn Georgra
Hou'ever Georgra statcd officrallv that rt uould
not ratrfr- the 1994 treatv of fnendshrp. good-
ncrghbourly' relatrons and coopcratron u'ith Rus-
sra or the mrlrtan' arrangements ln connectlon
u'rth that treatv untrl rts 
.;urisdrctron \\as cstab-
hshcd throughout the countn, Mr Shevardnadzc
made clear that the future of Russra's mrlrtary
bases tn Gcorgra x'ould be rel'roicd rf Russra drd
not contnbute to restonng thc country"s unlt)'.
59 Russra u'anted to develop relatrons urth
Georgra as though the Abkhazr rssue drd not ex-
rst Thc parties agreed to rc-cstabhsh the rarl
coruectron along the Black Sea (through
Abkhazra) rvith Russra guaranteeing its securitv
The1, also came to an agreement about retaining
a militarl, base in the Abkhazr to$n of Gudauta
Abkhazr protests on grounds that Abkhazra had
not been consulted rvere ignored
60. Moreover, the Russran side had drstanced
itsclf from the Abkhazr lcadershrp. cntrcrsrng rt
for rntransrgcnce during the negotiatrons, and
threatened to step up mrlrtan,ard to Georgra rn
thc event of their farlure President Yeltsrn ar-
gued in favour of progrcssive re-establishment of
Russia's territorial intcgntr
6l . Thc political drscussions \\'ere accom-
panied b1' practical actron of some signrficance.
Gcorgia thres' a cordon around southem and
eastern Abkhazra, rvhrle Russra blockaded rt to
the north Onll' Sukhumr. the caprtal. rcmained
in contact ivith the outsrde u'orld and maintamed
a tradc route u'rth Turkev for csscnilal goods, but
this was blockadcd bv Russran u'arshrps on 23
October 1995 The blockade u'as hfted a xeek
Iater after the Abkhazr dclegation refused to con-
trnue the peace negotlatlons and accused Russia
of havrng abandoned rts role as medrator and of
opcnll' supportrng onc of the partres to the con-
flrct Houe.v'er. in order to trghten thc blockadc,
Russran bordcr-guards recerved orders not to
alloii Abkhazi passport-holders to travel to Tur-
ker', the onlv countn that recognrsed Abkhazr
crtrzenshrp
62 Russra also thrcatened to rr rthdrau' the
3 000 troops rt had sent ln 1994 to malntarn
peace along the border betnccn Abkhazia and
Georgra and prevent a rcsumptron of hostrlrties
Georgra rssued several \\.arnlngs that rt u'ould not
toleratc an)' crtcnsron of the peacckeeprng
forcc's mandate and that rt mrght use mrlrtary
means to resoive thc problcrn
63 The Abkhazr srde for rts part accused the
Russran peacekccpers of usrng troops from thc
Russran Arml's Transcaucaslan unrt. 80% of
s'hose membcrs u'ere of Gcorgran nattonalrtv
Thcv marntarncd that an agreemcnt had bccn
concluded on a Jolnt Russran-Gcorgran mrlrtan,
operatron drrcctcd agalnst Abkhazra and that an
lnvasron u'as plamcd for the end of Septembcr
Furthermorc. accordrng to unconfirmed rcports,
thc Russrans had draftcd rn tuclvc combat hch-
copters and sparc parts for SU-27 fighter arr-
craft In Januan lc)96 the Abkhazr secunty
servlcc clarmed that thc Russran Dcfencc Mrnrs-
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ter had agreed to dchver five manne landing craft
to Georgra to carr,'out an assault on the Abkhazi
stretch of thc Black Sea coast.
64 In latc 1995, pressure was mountmg on
Abkhazra to reach a polrtical settlement. A confi-
dentral draft protocol drawn up to resolve the
conflrct had bcen leakcd tn Novcmber follou'ing
negotiations in Moscori' bctu'een thc two parties.
u'ith Russia as mediator. Thc protocol offered
Abkhazra rts oun constitution, legislatrve po\\'er,
government, army and budget Abkhazrs and
Georgrans uould share government and legisla-
tive pow'er, rvith Parhament havmg reservcd seats
for Abkhazi membcrs. rvho uould have a rrght of
veto. The draft protocol also provided for a joint
dcfence pohcy and coordrnation betrveen both
armies, and for a single currencv Abkhazi legrs-
lators re;ccted the document.
65 There ls also rnternal oppositron ln
Georgia to an1' deal rvrth Abkhazra Thc tu'o
most contentious lssucs conccrn, first, thc
Abkhazr armv and thc extent to rvhich Gcorgia
could accept the exrstence of an independent
armcd force that mrght provrdc a mcans of future
sccessron. and second. the fate of refugecs.
Abkhazra opposed the repatrtatton of more than
200 000 Georgran refugces fleeing from the fall
of Sukhumi rn 1993. Aftcr tu'o vears u'ork and
at substantial cost, thc Hrgh Commtssroner for
Refugecs has managed to organise the return of
onli' 300 The problem rs a scrious one as far as
Georgia ls concerned stnce repatriatron could
begrn rn the abscncc of anv official agrcement
Georgra uas of thc vrerv that thc peacekeeprng
missron should not stmplr' conslst of keeprng the
tu'o sidcs apart but should tnclude help for refu-
gecs to rcturn to Abkhazra The Abkhazr srde
marntalns that tt cannot cxerctsc cffective control
over the Gala distrrct. the malontv of u'hosc pop-'
ulatron pnor to hostrlrtres u'as Gcorgtan and to
rrhrch refugces are returnmg u'tthout official
agreement
66. In Januan 1996. at the CIS Summtt tn
Moscou. Gcorgra asked for extensrle collectrvc
sanctrons to bc apphed ovcr and above the de
fctclo economrc embargo alreadv tmposed on
Abkhazra Desprte Russra's support, this requcst
had onll lukeu'arm backrng from CIS hcads of
state. fir,'e of u'hom dld not u'rsh to commlt them-
selves Thc mandatc on peacckceprng oporatlons
had been extended untrl 19 Apnl 1996 but drd
not cover pohce dutres or assistancc to refugees
to return home. Economic sanctions could
scarcely go much furthcr than thc existrng em-
bargo.
67. Developments in Southern Ossctia havc
been lcss spectacular Russta's posrtlon on thc
principle of terrrtonal intcgntl' (strengthened by
e!'ents in Chechnya) couplcd ri'ith thc strategrc
requrrcment to consolidate an alliance u'ith
Georgia have left Southern Ossetia u'rth little
hope of being reunrted lr,rth Northern Ossetia
u'hich is srtuated on Russian Federation territory
Georgra had adopted a policl' of cooperatron over
resolving the refugee problem, drsarming rllegal
mrlrtia and reabsorbrng cconomlc difficulties.
68. Fortunatell', fcu violent tnctdents have
occurred since patrols u'ere drafted rnto thc
rcgion as part of a pcacekeeping operation m-
volvmg Georgians. Osscttans. and Russians
Both Georgia and Southern Ossetia constder thc
posrtron rs sufficrentlr stable and have suggestcd
rernforcrng the Russran prcsence so that therr
orrn forces can u,tthdrau
5. Chechnt'a
69 As a result of the pcace agrcemcnt srgned
on 12 Ma1, 1997 br Presrdent Yeltsrn and the
Chechen Presrdent. follou'rng three 1'ears of
bloodl' and desperatc u'arfare. rt has been possl-
ble to make a start on restorlng normalrtl' rrr'the
region. As far as rts economrc development in
partrcular rs concerned. thrs process has major
consequenccs of a scalc that surpass the regronal
problems pcrslsting rn that part of Russta After
months of ncgotratrons Chechnva and Russia
reached agreement rn Moscox' on 9 Septembcr
1997 on the shrpment bv the end of thc r ear of an
inrtial 200 000 tonnes of orl from Azcrbatlan vta
thc prpeline runnlng from Baku to Novorossiy'sk
through Chechnyal' Thc agreement u'tll have a
maJor lmpact on the pohcrcs of all those coun-
trres u'rth an rntcrcst rn thc crtraction. rmport and
export of the vast orl and natural gas resourccs
under the Caspran Sea and thc surroundlng areas
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IV. The new "Greqt Game" to exploit and
control the natural resources
of the Caucasus and central Asia
70 Knouledgc of thc existence of petroleum
deposits in the central Asian region and thc Cau-
casus goes nght back to the l3th century. In our
ou,n century, they have repeatedly been hotlv
contested both by regional and world powers.
Technological developments in the lgth century
made it possible to cxploit oil reserves more in-
tensively and this has led to an increasinglv
intense struggle for control over the region Turk-
menistan and Kazakhstan's natural resources
were not discovered and rvorked until the 1950s
and competition therefore focused essenttallv on
the Caucasus and the Caspran Sea area.
71. The orl from this region plaved a maJor
strategrc role durrng thrs centurl"s tu'o u'orld
\\'ars Protectrng the oilfields of thc Caucasus
was an Allied pnorrty Dunng the second rvorld
x'ar, oil from the Caucasus \{as an essential tar-
get of Hrtler's expansionist policres Follou'ing
the 1939 German-Sovret pact. Sovret oil from the
Caucasus accounted for a thrrd of Germanr''s
imports. In 1942. Germanv repeatedll' con-
ducted mrlrtan campargns to gain control over
thc region's natural resources
72 Torvards the end of the lgth ccntun,, cut-
throat competitron had alreadv built up betu-een
the oil comparues Russra, fearing loss of control
over its petroleum markets. sabotaged an agree-
ment ln 1895 betri'ecn Amcrican Standard Oil.
the Rothschilds and Nobels Competitron rn the
reglon \\'as tncreasrngir, fuellcd b1, ethnic conflict.
admrnrstrative corruptron and underdcveloped
legal and trade practrces
73 Natural rcsources have becomc a maJor
tssue in the Caucasus and ccntral Asra rn recent
vears Specrahsts reckon that the area mrght
contaln the uorld's thrrd largest orl and natural
gas resen'es after the Gulf region and Srberia
Orl resourccs are estrmated at 200 brlhon barrels
The most extensive fields havc becn located rn
Kazakhstan and Azerbarlan Other lesser rc-
scryes and orl explottatron sltes are to be found rn
Georgia. Uzbekrstan, Turkmenistan and Armc-
nla It has been possrble rn thc post-Sovret cra
for Western companles to estabhsh themselves rn
the area, bnngrng neu' technologres u rth them
Geologrcal surveys usrng sophrstrcated equlp-
ment havc shox'n that rescn,cs arc probablv
much larger than earlier surveys carried out
under the Soviet reglme (norv some 40 y,ears out
of datc) had suggested The strategic importance
of thc region ls lncreasrng as more orl is drs-
covered
74 Accordrng to mdustrral analvsts. Kazakh-
stan, urth over 60 billion barrels, has the largest
orl and gas deposits of the countries of the former
Sovret Unron. Azerba4an has a much larger pot-
ential for production than Soviet geologists pre-
drcted. Turkmenistan, rvhose main resource is
natural gas. ranks thrrd among the orl-rich
natrons of the regions, \vlth estimated reserves of
46 bilhon barrels Uzbekistan has 230 orl and
natural gas fields Georgia also has energlr res-
ources, although not on the same scale as rts
neighbours Armcnra. Kirghrzstan and Ta;ikr-
stan's reserves are smaller Desprte their enor-
mous orl potentral. the countries of the Caucasus
and ccntral Asra, suffer from inadequate mfra-
structural development u'hrch restricts economrc
grouth and leaves them very lulnerable inter-
natronalll'
75 The fall of the Sovrct emprre and its con-
comrtant loss of rnflucnce in thc region has
turned the latter into a grev area u'here regronal
po\\'ers are prtted agatnst one another. each
seekrng to cnsure that their interests prcvarl
rvrthrn the n*r, successor repubhcs to the former
USSR. These countncs are scekrng a balance
behveen the rnterests of the regronal pou'cr bro-
kers and therr orrrr national interests and are
hoprng that therr natural resources u'rll offer
them thc means of developrng thcrr economles.
thus gencratrng thc stabilrtv that is needcd u.rthrn
the regron Onc of the ma.1or problems of these
landlocked states ls orl transport, for u'hrch the1,
are dcpendcnt on cooperatron rvith thcrr nergh-
bours Thrs rs lcadrng to thc formatron at re-
gronal and rnternatronal levels of a serres of alh-
ances and countcr alhances. the arm of u'hrch rs
to allou' the countnes rnr,,olved to garn access to
or rnfluence ovcr somc of the u,orld's most lm-
portant natural resen,es
16 Among the qucstrons that cxplortatron of
thc natural rcsourccs of the region ralses rs that
of the legal status of thc Caspran Sca. of oil and
gas pipelinc routcs for anv devclopment and rn
partrcular thc shanng out of concesslons among
rnterested countncs and companres
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1. The legal status ofthe Caspian Sea
77. The problem raised by the status of the
Caspian Sca is rvhether rt should be regardcd as a
sea or a lake There are hro vieu's on the
subject: (t) thc Caspran Sea is a sea and hence
divrded into sectors in accordance rvith the 1982
Unrted Nations Convention on the Larv of thc
Sea, u'hich is unrversallv apphcable and gives
everJ' coastal state exclusivc rights to exploit the
resources in rts orm sector. Thrs legal positron
can be traced back to a decision by'the Sovtet
Union's Energv Mrnistn' in 1970 which has smce
become customary practice Azerbaijan, Kazakh-
stan and (with some reservattons) Turkmenistan
support this argument (rr) T\e Caspran Sea is
an inland sea and the 1982 Conventron on the
Larv of the Sea can under no circumstances
apply In this case the Caspran Sea cannot be
divided into sectors but must be exploited as a
smgle terrrtory b1' the coastal states as a whole
(condomrnium) Thrs rs also the position rvhich
emgrges from the l92l and 1940 Treaties con-
cluded betrteen Iran and the Sovret Uruon.
Russia and Iran support thrs interpretatron.
78 The present status of the Caspran Sea rs
govemed b1' the Treatv of 25 March 1940 be-
tu'een Iran and the Sovret Union. The Treaty of
26 February I921, n'hereby' Russia annulled all
treaties hmitrng the rights of the Pcrsrans, laid
doun the legai foundatrons for the Caspran Sea
reglme The Persrans thus obtained the nght to
have their oun flect and sarl under their oun flag
This instrument rs the cornerstone of thc present
reglme goverrung the Caspran Sea uhich is
jorntll' explorted bv coastal states on an cqual
footrng
79 Letters exchanged upon srgnature of the
1940 Treatl' shou that the Caspian Sea ts re-
garded b1 Iran and Russia as "a Souet and
Iranran sca". provrdrng a clear rllustration of rts
status The rules of the Intematronal Larv of thc
Sea can be apphcd to thc Caspran Sea onh' tn-
asmuch as thrs contmental resen'orr has no dtrect
outlct to the occan or the open sea and to the ex-
tent that no agreement has been reached betrveen
coastal states on applvrng such rules to the
Caspran
80 Azerbar;an, Turkmcnrstan and Kazakhstan
have trrcd to drssocrate thcmselves from the pres-
ent lcgal arrangemcnts govemrng thc Caspran
Sea rn ordcr to obtarn unrlatcral prrvrlcges re-
garding the explortatton of tts natural resources.
Azerbarjan has laid clarm to a huge tract of the
Caspian seabed and on 20 September 1994
srgned a contract rvith an mternational consor-
tium for the cxploitatron of petroleum deposits.
In 1993, Turkmenistan passed a larv on its
natronal borders rvhich made reference to mternal
waters, territorial seas and exclusive economic
zones.
81. Russra rejccts Azerbarlan's inttiattve on
the grounds that it is based on the "rllegal" prin-
ciple of the exrstence of an Azert sector of the
Caspran Sea, determrned unilateralll'. On the
other hand, it supports Iran's inittatrve for the
creation of an intemational organisatton rvtth a
remit to settle an.l' problems relating to the ex-
ploitation of the Caspian Sea.
82. At a conference held in Moscorv m Octo-
ber 1994, participants might have reachcd
agreement on the text of a treaty had Azerbaryan
not categoricalli, rejected it Azerbatlan's first
prrority rs in fact to obtarn a change m the status
of the Caspran Sea (ri'rth regard to rts partition)
and then and onll' thcn is rt u'illing to consider
the possrbrlity of cooperatton Follou,tng the con-
ference, Kazakhstan also changed rts stance,
coming out rn favour of partrtron into national
sectors.
83 Russia consrders that the creatlon of a re-
gional organrsatron rvould facilitate the con-
clusron of such agreements and make rt possible
to resolvc the rvrder problems connected u'ith
rmprovrng the legal regrme In its vteu' only the
present legal regimc can guarantee erplottatton
of resources and permrt involvement b1' forcrgn
companres Anv contract or actn'ttv that farled to
take account of thrs perspectlve ri'ould bc rc-
garded as null and vord and u'ould provtdc no
guarantee for its authors or for particrpants
agarnst the possrbrlrtv of drffrcultres
84. Iran semr-officiallv has its oun Caspian
Sea zone and supports the Russtan positton u'htle
acknou-ledging the nccd for a change rn the cxist-
ing status. Iran rs seekrng to rnvolve rtself as
much as possrble rn oil pro.lects ri'tth other states
and u'as srdehned from the Azerbar.;an consor-
tium under pressure from thc United Statcs Iran
has also concluded an agreemcnt urth Russta on
cxploitatron and commercialtsatton of caviar
from the Caspran Sca
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85. Turkmenistan generally supports Iran's
and Russia's posrtion. In July 1996, rvhen Presi-
dent Niyazov visited Iran, he stated that the mat-
ter of the five coastal states estabhshing a nct\.
status rvas of pnme importance. However Turk-
menistan does not attend all the multilateral con-
ferences. The underdeveloped state ofits offshore
development may explain the fact that its
position tends to be less hardline than that of Az-
erbagan or Kazakhstan.
86. Follou'ing a meeting in March 1996 w,ith
the Russran Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Bolsha-
kov, President Niyazov came out in favour of
coordinated action by the five coastal states and
against any unilateral initiatrves, u,hereas dunng
his visrt to Azerbar.lan he announced that Turk-
menistan had entered into drscussions rvith
Dutch, American and Russran companies about
explortation of its zone.
87. Kazakhstan is la1'rng claim to its oun
zone. In earl1, 1995, the Kazakh and Russlan
Forergn Mrnrsters took entirely opposlng vle\\,s
Erther the Caspian Sea is an internatronal lake
and must be drvided equrtablv betu'een all the
coastal states or it is a sea u,here internatronal
legrslatron could be apphed and u'here the terri-
torial uaters of each countrl,should be dehmited
Kazakhstan also consrders that the Volga should
be regarded as an internatronal s,atenva\', a posl-
tron naturallv relected bi,the Russrans.
88. Kazakhstan has had seismological studres
done offshore u'rth the help of Western compa-
nies rn ordcr to el'aluate its reserves u'hrch ri,ould
appear to be ofthe order of l0 brllion tonnes of
orl and 2000 bilhon cubrc mctres of gas Russra
rnrtrallv condcmned thesc activrtles as .'illegal
and unrlateral" but. smce Aprrl 1996. secms to
have reached an agreement u'rth Kazakhstan A
document has been signed by both srdes and
Russran companies have been rnvrtcd to contrrb-
ute to the development of orl rcsenes on
Kazakhstan's contrnental shelf
89 Azcrbar;an rs thc countn' most stronglv
opposed to Russra's posrtion and has untlatcrallv
dcclared that its sovcrergntv extcnds ovcr rts
Caspran Sca zone Thc Unrted States supported
Azerbarlan rn rts dcclaratron Amcncan compa-
nies have stated that thel' x'rll not take account of
existrng drfferences betu'een the coastal states
over the matter of status
90. It is difficult to say rvhether the different
pomts of vierv on the legal status of thc Caspian
Sea will eventuallv result in a peaceful arrange-
ment that is satisfactory to all the rnterested
partles, or rvhether thel'lvill lead to a position of
conflict rnvolvrng major pou'ers.
9l Durrng the Subcommittee's talks u,ith
contacts in Kazakhstan. the Dcputy Foreign
Minister voiced hrs convrction that there u'as rn
fact no generally recognrsed status and that under
cover of legal argumcnts, the issue u'as rn fact
essentialll' a political one He felt that in any
event any partrtion should correspond to the sec-
tors assigned to each ofthe coastal states
92. In rts discussrons r.rrth the Azeri authorities
on the same topic. President Alrvev's spccial ad-
viser revealed that rn the meantime Russra, Iran
and Turkmenistan had in practice accepted that
the rcsources of thc Caspran Sca should be di-
vided up bv sector
2. Policies for the exploitation of natural resources
93. In terms of pohcres on the expiortation of
thc relevant natural resources b1'the states on the
shores of the Caspran Sea. it rvould appear that
all of them share an rntcrest rn drversrfuing thc
involvement of countrres and ma;or companies
prepared to inl'est rn rnstalhng or upgradrng the
infrastructure necessan' for orl and gas produc-
tron.
94. Kazakhstan has begun exportrng rts orl to
Europe u'rthout usrng the old Russran netu'ork.
In late 1996. Tengrzchevrorl (a.;ornt veuturc be-
tu'een Kazakhstan and the Amencan compan\r
Chevron) cxported orl to Europc br.road. rarl and
shrp Exrstrng prpehnes todav all run through
Russra and Kazakhstan ls thus dcpcndent on
Russra's goodurll Hou'ever. Kazakhstan srgned
an agreement $'ith China on 28 September 1997
provrdrng. rnter altq. for loint constructron of
tu'o orl prpehncs. to be opcratronal br the vear
2002
95 Under the Tengtzchevrorl Jotnt venturc,
Kazakhstan's Tengrz orlficld began opcratrons in
Apnl 1993 Chevron's lnvcstment rn thrs contract
rs probabll one of thc largest made bv an Amcrr-
can comparlr' on the tcrnton, of thc formcr Sovret
Unron Horvcvcr Chcvron dccrdcd to lou'cr rts
rnvestment rate in 1995 becausc of erport drffi-
culties resultrng from Russia's non-complrance
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with an agreement it had srgned rvith Chevron
and Kazakhstan, authorrsing Tengizchevrorl to
export between 65 000 and 130 000 barrels per
day
96. Mentron should also be made of
Kazakhstan's Karachaganak field contarning orl
and natural gas deposits and reckoned to be
approxrmately trvo-thirds of thc size of the Ten-
grz field In June 1992, Kazak,hstan concluded
an agreement ivith British Gas and Agrp to res-
tore the field. ri'hich had detenoratcd because of
shortcomings rn Russran technology. However
attempts b1' Bntish Gas and Agip to conclude a
long-tcrm agreement encountered obstacles and
comphcations of a financial, polrtrcal and technr-
cal nature
91 On l0 February' 1995, Kazakhstan rvas
obhged to wnte the Russran natural gas companv
Gazprom rnto the agreement governing thc Kara-
chaganak field. Accordrng to rndustrral sources.
Russra threatened to place an embargo on Kara-
chaganak gas and orl exports and to hmrt salcs of
products from thc field to l5o/" of their u'orld
market valuc unless Gazprom ri'as rncluded in thc
proJect On 2 March 1995 Kaz-akhstan srgned a
Productron Sharing Prrnciples Agrccment uith
Brrtish Gas. Agip and Gazprom''
98 Kazakhstan's off-shore reserves are estr-
matcd at approxrmatelr' 25 brlhon barrels (on a
par u'rth those of Nrgeria) and possrbly contarn
more orl than thc Tcngrz field The agreement
urth Caspishelf Consortrum (CC) for thc explo-
ratron of an area of approxrmatell' 35 000 kmz
u,as ratrfied in Decembcr 1993 The pro.;ect is
also meant to include an cnvrrorulcntal stud1,.
Each partner mav acqulrc del'elopment nghts
over t\\o scgmcnts rnsrde thc scctorl3
99 Turkmerustan has the u'orld's thrrd largcst
natural gas dcposrts. rn othcr uords equal to all
the Persian Gulf deposrts taken together Grvcn
that Turkmenrstan rs essentralll desert and that
its other marn resource. cotton. has failen prel'to
bad han'csts. the country"5 cconomlc survtt'al
lvill depend on succcssful erplortatron of rts natu-
ral gas rescrves Gas productron plummeted
rr Sce Rosemarrc Forslthe . "The pohlrcs o.[ otl tn the
Cattcastts and central --1sta"...1clelphr Popcr 300.
1996
" Ih,d
from 85 000 mrlhon mt to 32 300 million over
the penod from rndepcndcnce to 1995. Produc-
Ion has nscn since, thanlis to the opening up of
neu' markcts. Thrs falling-off of sales cost the
country somc 2 billion doilars pcr annum in lost
exports. The "gas-taps" that are strll open arc
suppl;-rng rnsolvent customers such as Russra,
Ukraine, Georgra and Armcnia On 25 October
\997, an international consortium led by'the Am-
cncan Unocal companv signed a US$ 2 brlhon
contract to build a gas-hne to brrng gas from
Turkmenrstan to Pakrstan via Afghanistan The
part of the line passrng through Afghanrstan will
bc 750 km long and Turkmenistan's President
Nry'azov confirmcd that he had the promise of
support for the pro1ect from the Tahban, rvho
control most of the countn'. and also from the
antr-Tahban factions
100 Hou'cver rt \\as rn Azerbar.lan that thc
"contract of the centun," uas concluded in 1994
In 1991. a number of foreign companies, rnclud-
ing Amoco, BP, McDermott. Pennzoil, Ramco.
Unocal, TPAO and Statorl opcned negotratrons
rvrth Azerbauan to devclop the Azen. Chirag and
Gunashir fields rn the Azen sector of the Caspran
Sea The ncgotiatrons \\-ere protractcd and drffi-
cult and agrcemcnt u'as due to bc srgned u'ith
Prcsrdent Elchibey rn June 1993. nherebl, Azer-
bagan's State Orl Companr' (SOCAR) rvould
takc a 30% share rn the pro.;ect Hou'evcr Elchr-
bcr"s sudden orcrthrou' brought thc comparues
back to the negotrating table mth Presidcnt
AIrvcv
l0l In October 1993. the partres srgned a ne\\'
dcvclopment protocol rihrch drd not covcr the
Gunashh field In Apnl 199+. SOCAR officrally
announced to lts consortrunr partners that thc
Russran compan\ Lukoil uould takc a l0o,'o
hoidrng (from SOCAR's oun share) The dcal
u'as finallv srgned on 20 Scptcmbcr 1994 Rus-
sran Forergn Mrnrster Kozvrev rranted to rmpose
an economlc embargo on Azerbaqan for srgnrng
the contract In thc course of 199-1. Russta sent
a drplomatrc notc to the Unrtcd Krngdom clatm-
rng tire right ofvcto ovcr anv contracts concluded
rn thc Caspran and advisrng rt not to tnvcst tu thts
partrcular onc Thc companrcs rnvolred tn the
consortlum \\'cre conccrned about futurc prcssurc
Russra mrght ercrt. srnce rt could. orvtng to its
control over the Volga rrver. obstruct thc passage
of any hcar,r' equrpmcnt bound for thc tntcrnal
rvatcrs of the Caspran
l9
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102 Holever, on 20 Septembcr 1994 an
agrcement u'as srgned on productron sharing.
This u'as ratified b1, the Azcrbar.lan Parhament
on 2 Dccember 1994 and took effect on 12
December 1994 The productron-shanng agrec-
ment uas for a term of 30 1'ears. The contract
estlmated the orl resen/es of thcsc fields at 4 bil-
hon barrels. As far as exports arc concemed, a
first pipeline runs across Russra, and the AIOC
has started building a second prpehne nets'ork
through Georgia, due for completron in late
1998 Findrng itself unablc to finance its 20oh
sharc. SOCAR rs to transfer a further 5o/o to
TPAO. In spring 1995. follou'mg intense com-
petrtron bctn'een Exxon, Iran, Mobil, Elf-
Aqurtarne. Agrp and Shell, Azerbar.;an offered a
5o% share to Exron In December 1994, the con-
sortrum had formed the Azerbarjan Internatronal
Operating Companl' (AIOC), made up of 1l
maJor petroleum comparues x'ith Tcrn' D.
Adams as Charrman AIOC's task rs to morutor
the prolect on a dar'-to-da1'basis Some 70% of
the profits from the contract urll go to Azer-
barlan Productron could be around 200 000
barrels per dav bt' end-1999 but full capacrtv
urll not be reached untrl 2004
103 Gn'cn the problems encountered in nego-
trating thc contract the companrcs proceeded u'rth
cautron Thc contract had bccn drafted m such a
u'av that the partres could termrnate it under
certarn condrtrons u'hcrc potentral problems
could rnterfere urth the propcr rmplementatron of
tts provrsrons These \\crc as follorvs
- 
the spread of the \\'ar ln Nagorno-
Karabakh.
- 
srgnrficant dctenoratlon ln rclatrons
betrr e en Russra and Azcrbaryan.
- 
rnstabrlrtv urthrn Azerbarlan.
- 
inabrlrtv of the govemmcnt of Azer-
barlan to find a stablc cxport route.
- 
anl drsagrccment ovcr the regrmc gov-
ernlng the status of thc Caspran Sca
104 Currcnt partlclpatlon ls as follori's
SOCAR I0% (Azerba4an). Amoco Caspran Sca
Petroleum Lrmrted 11 0l% (Unrted States). BP
Exploratron (Caspran Sca) Lrmited. l7 1261%
(Unrtcd Krngdom). Dclta Nrmrr Khazar Ltd
I 689'' (Saudr Arabra), Den Norskc Stats
Olrcsclscap a s 8 56339/,' (Nonral'). S/C Lukorl
l0% (Russia), Pennzorl Caspian Corporatron:
4 8175% (Unrtcd States): Ramco Khazar Energy
Ltd : 2 0825% (Unrted Krngdom). Turkie
Pctrollarr A.O .6.75% (Turkei'); Unocal Khazar
Ltd 10.0489% (Unrtcd States); Exxon. 8 006%
(Unrted Statcs). Itochu. 3 9205% (Japan).
Amerrcan companles are thereforc in the lead
nrth approxrmatclv a 40o/o rntercst follou'ed b1,
the Brrtrsh rvrth around l97o
105. On l0 November 1995 the Azen Govcrn-
ment srgned a contract urth thc CIPCO (Caspran
Internatronal Petroleum Company') made up of
Lukorl, Agrp and Pennzorl, under rts current
Chairman James A Trllev Thrs contract rvas
approvcd in thc form of a prece of legrslatron
and u'as ratrfied by' thc Azen Parhament on 13
Fcbruarl 1996. LukAgip had a 45o/o share, Agrp
(Ital1) 5%. Lukorl (Russra) 12 5% and Pcnnzorl
(Unrted States) acqurrcd a 30o/, share Thc Azeri
companv SOCAR held 7 5% The conccssron,
thc Karabakh field (uhrch has no connectron ruth
the Nagorno-Karabakh regron) hes some 120 km
off the coast from Baku. ri'ith a surface area of
approximate\' 427 kmr and rescn,cs esttmated at
betu,een 450 mrlhon and I 26 brlhon barrcls of
crude orl and natural gas The fields are some 20
km north of the Azerr. Chrrag and Gunashh
fields devcloped bv the AIOC Water depth var-
rcs betuecn 160 and 22-5 metrcsra
106 Elf-Aqurtarne srgned an agreement u'rth
SOCAR on the erploratron. exploitatron and
sharcd productron of the Lankaran and Talvsh
fields. on 13 Januan' 1997 The agreement \\.as
signed rn Parrs rn the prcscnce of Azerr Prcsrdent
Hevdar Alrvev and Frcnch Presrdent Chrrac
Othcr companres arc to lorn the consortrum The
Lankaran-Talvsh ficlds cover an arca of .120 kmr
and hc at a sea dcpth of bctrrecn 20 and 100
mctrcs Partrcrpatron rs as follou's Elf Petro-
lcum Azerbarlan B \/ (France) 40%. Total
Exploratron & Productron (Francc) 10%.
SOCAR (Azcrbar;an) 25 o,/o. Demrncx Azerbaryarr
Petroleum GrnbH (Gcrmanl) I09',. Frna Oil Gas
S A (Belgrum) 
-r9,". Orl Industrrcs Engmecrtng
and Constructron (OIEC. Iran) 10%
l0l The contract for the crploratron and dcvcl-
opment of thc Ashrafi and Dan Ulduzu fields bv
the North Abshcron Opcratrng Companv
OIAOC) rras ratified bv thc Azcrbarlan Parha-
20
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mcnt on 25 Januan' 1997 Thc NAOC includcs
SOCAR (Azerbarlan) 20o/o, Arnoco (US) 30%,
Unocal (US) 25 5%, Delta (Saudi Arabia) 4.5o/o
and Itochu (Japan) 20% Thc ficlds covcr an
area of 453 km2 and u,ater depth vanes betu,cen
75 and 200 metrcs. Invcstments made b1, thrs
consortlum are cstrmated at US$ 2 brllion. The
profit-sharing agreement u,ill result m a bonus of
US$ 75 mrllion for the Azerbar.lan Government
108. Responsibilitl' for the exploratron and
development of Azerbaryan's undenvater sector
has been grven to the Shah Daniz consortium.
The production-shanng agreement rvas signed on
4 June 1996 and took effect on l7 October 1996
BP Exploration Ltd is responsible for the explor-
tation of the field Shah Daniz rs a partnership
betueen BP (Unrted Kingdom) and Statoil
Alliance (Nonvar'), cach u'ith a 25 5o/o sharc
The other partners are SOCAR (10%), Lukorl
(Russia) l0%, Elf (France) l0%, OIEC (Iran)
10% and TPAO (Turkrsh Petroleum) 9o/'. Thc
contract covcrs an area of about 200 m2 rn thc
Caspran Sea. 70 km from Baku The productron-
sharing agrcemcnt provides for a budget of US$
200 mrlhon, a 3-r'car exploratron phase and the
publicatron of a report on the rntroductton of nov
safetl' and environmental standards
109 Azerbarjan's efforts to follorv an inde-
pendent polici' in the shadou' of the ma.;or
po\\'ers. in partrcular Russia and thc Unrted
States. thrs vear took the form of the follourng
developments
I l0 An agreement on the pnncrples relating to
the development and cxploitatron of thc Kapaz
field n'as srgncd on -l Jull' l99l n Moscou' bc-
t\\'een SOCAR (Azerbarlan) 50%. Lukoil
(Russra) 30o/o and Rosncf (Russra) 20% Rc-
scn/es are cstrmated at more than 100 mrlhon
tonnes of orl Thc gor,ernment of Turkmcnrstan
protested agalnst slgnaturc of thc contract on the
grounds that thc Kapaz srte hes rn thc Turkmen
sector of thc Caspran Sca. rmplf ing that Azcr-
bar;an and Russra thereforc have no rrght to
make decrsrons as to rts development Azerbar.lan
rs basrng rts entrtlement to erplort thrs field on
the fact that Azeri englneers discovered it rn
1959 and have been u'orkmg rt srncc 1983
Moreover a decrsron in 1970 bv the Sovret
energ)'minrstcr fonnalll' assrgned the srte to thc
Azeri sector of the Caspran Sea Total rnvest-
mcnt provrded under the contract came to ap-
proxrmately'US$ I brlhon Talks are in progress
to guarantec Turkmcnrstan an equrtable sharc in
thc prolect
I I I Anothcr contract betu'ccn SOCAR
(Azerbarjan) 50o/oand Lukorl (Russia) 50%o. u'as
concluded m Moscou on 3 Julr, 1991 for explor-
tatron of the Galana srte Hou'cver the largcst
contracts rvere srgned u'rth the American com-
panies, Exxon. Chevron. Amoco and Mobil dur-
ing Presrdent Alivev's visit to the Unrted States.
The value of these contracts is estrmated at some
US$ l0 billionr5
l12. Does this therefore rndicate a change in thc
direction of Unrted States policy' in the Cauca-
sus? Some representatrves of the State Depart-
ment and of Congress are in fact u'ondcnng rf thc
lau'passed tn 1992 prohrbrtrng anl,American aid
rvhatsoever to Azcrbar.lan should not be rcpcaled
Thrs picce of legrslatron n'as rntended to support
Amerrcan pohcl' rn the conflrct in Nagorno-
Karabakh. uhen thc Unrted Statcs rnrtralh, sup-
ported thc Armcnran posltron Amcncan rntercst
rn exploiting Azerbarlan's natural resourccs mav
possrblv speed up the process of settlement of thc
Nagomo-Karabakh confl rct
3. The pipeline battle
ll3. As far as the rmportant rssue of export
routes rs concerncd. the latest development u'as
the openrng. on 12 November 1997. of the orl
pipeline betu'een Baku and Novorossrvsk. u,hich
u'ill carn'orl extractcd bi.the AIOC rnternatronal
consortrum across Russran terrrton' r'ra Grosnt'
rn Chechny'a For thc trrnc bcrng relatn,clv mod-
cst quantrtrcs arc rnr oll cd (roughh' 40 000
tonncs per month). but the opcnrng of thc prpchnc
ts ner''crthclcss rcqardcd rn Azerbar.lan as a major
stcp fonrard. srncc N{oscou for a trmc scvcrcd
communlcatrons urth Baku and thc \\ar rn
Chcchnl'a niadc that partrcular prpclnc cxtrcmc-
lv rulnerablc
l14 Hou.ever. thrs developmcnt agaln rcvcals
the drfficultv of findrng altcrnatrrc supplr lrncs
for Azcrbarlan's orl. uhrch rs prinranlv of rntcr-
est to countrres that do not \\'ant to depcnd ex-
clustvell' on the goodu'rll of the Russran Fedcra-
tlon The avarlable optrons mclude the follourng
2l
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Orlprpelns Total
l*gth
(km)
Cost of
tnl'c-stmcnl
(dollm)
1'rarrsport
cost
(dollarV
tome)
Io,gth
ttr
counlr\'
0<m)
.{zerbarlan
Crmrga
'[urke1
(Celtran'
\{edrterranean)
2 000 4 8 brlhon 24 | 200
250
I 200
Azerbarlan
Georga
(Batumr
Black Sea)
800 1 8 brlhon 9 400
400
Azerbarlan
Russra
(liovorossrysk'
Black Sea)
I 300 2 brlhon t0 200
I 100
Bulgana
Crreece
(Burgas
AJexandrouphs)
275 700 rrulhon 35 l4-5
t30
Alternaliv,a oil supply routes from Azerbaijan
to the Mecliterraneqn t6
I l5 Othcr solutrons are also berng considercd,
some of u'hrch \\'crc mcntloncd durrng thc Sub-
commlttee's vlsrt to Kazakhstan and Azerbagan
On27 September 1997. China put an end to the
border drspute rt has had \\'lth Kazakhstan srnce
the demrse of the Sovret Unron and thc t\\'o
countrles have srgned an oil agreement u'orth
USS 9 
-5 bilhon The settlement of the dispute
\\'as prompted b1'the desire to conclude orl agree-
ments Negotratrons. $'hlch have been gomg on
for tu'o )'ears. ha\,'e concluded $'ith an agreement
bet*'een Kazakh President. Noursultan Nazar-
baev and Chrnese Premrer Li Peng. u'ho made a
specral tnp to Alma-Ata. the caprtal of Kazakh-
stan
I i 6 Apart from energv supphcs frorn thc Uzcn
and Akt\ublnsk sltcs. thc conccssron for u'hrch
has bccn an'ardcd to thc Chrnesc statc oll com-
panr'. the document provrdes for constructron of
tuo or1 prpchncs. to bc operational bv thc year
2002 Onc. 3 000 km long. uill cxtcnd to thc
Chrnesc bordcr. uhrlc the other, 2-50 km long.
\\'lll conncct *rth Turkmenrstan Thc route for
tn'o other branches rn east Kazakhstan rs stlll to
be negotrated
117 Turkmenrstan and Iran are currentlv
looking at other proJects for the constructron of a
'u Source l.e courrter de-s pa.t's dc I'Est,
August 1996
railu'a1, and prpelrncs rn order to explort Turk-
mcnlstan s ori and natural gas. from rihich Kaz-
akhstan could also bcnefit. Thus ovcr thc last
fcrv y'ears. Iran and Turkmcnrstan havc slgncd a
numbcr of coopcratron agrccments concenring oil
and natural gas suppl)' routcs, includrng a gas
prpeline constructlon pro;ect rvhich u'ould hnk
Turkmenrstan to Turkev and Europe via Iran
The formcr Amencan Secretary of State, Alex-
ander Harg. \\.as lnvoh,cd in coordinating thrs
deal. In Aprrl 1994. Turkmenrstan also con-
cluded an agreemcnt s'ith Iran for the con-
struction of an orl prpeline to suppll' northern
Iran s'rth Turkmen orl. There is also a project
for bringrng orl from Azerbar.lan through Arme-
rua and Turkel'to the Mediterranean. but Presi-
dent Alrvel rs agalnst rt. u'htle the Amencans are
opposcd to a prpehne passrng through Iran An
altcrnatrr,c prolcct for a prpehne through Gcorgia
to Turker ls bclng cxamrnod but Turkcf is not
partrcularlv keen on thc rdea Lastll'. thcrc arc
even plans to burld prpchnes that hnk Turkmcnr-
stan and Pakistan to Afghanrstan
I 18 If uc have concentrated m such dctarl in
thrs report on crplortatron of the Caspran Sca
reserves. it rs because Your Rapporteurs consrdcr
that rt \\-as rmportant to pomt to the comphcated
nature of a busrness deal that involvcs scveral
WEU member states. such as the United Krng-
dom. France. Germanl'. Italr,. Grecce and Bel-
grum. as u'ell as Turkev and Nonvar'. rvhrch are
WEU assocrate mcmbcrs. The vanous projects
for explortatron of the natural rcsourccs of the
Caspran Sea rn fact have polrtrcal repercussrons
as thc follorvrng cramplcs serv'e to demonstratc
I 19 In August 1993. to rcstnct orl supphcs
through the strarts of thc Bosporus and thus de-
flcct thcm on to thc Mcdrterranean routcs. Tur-
kev requcstcd revrsron. on ecologrcal grounds. of
the 1936 Conventron of Montreux. u'hrch
govcrns thc status of thc strarts Russra ob3ected
to thrs lnltratlvc. but aftcr a colltston betu'ecn an
orl tankcr and a cargo vessel on 13 March 1994,
Turkel'decreed the entn'rnto force of regulations
covenng mantrme traffic. as from i Juh' 1994
120 The Turkrsh proJect for a ''Medtterranean
route" startrng from the Turkish port of Ceyhan,
u'rll enable Turkn' to consohdate its hnks \\lth
the countnes of ccntral Asra. take maxrmum ad-
vantage of rts strateglc posrtron and geographrcNo 
.ll-1,
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proxlmrt)' to Caspian Sea orl resources and thus
consrdcrably' reduce its ovcrheads.
l2l. According to Turkish sources, complctton
of the Medrterranean route rvould have the fol-
lowing advantagcs
- 
the Turkish port of Ceyhan has the
nccessanr infrastructurc for petroleum
transport. The Iraqi prpelinc, closed b1'
Turkey,in 1990, has its outlet here. The
port can cater for ships of a tonnage
four trmes greater than the Russian port
of Novonssry,sk has capacitl, for. The
port of Ceyhan is open 365 day's a
year, rvhile the Russtan port is occa-
sionally closed on account of bad
weather,
- 
transport costs torvards rvestern Europe
u'ould be half those from thc port of
Novorosstl'sk;
- 
the fall in traffic through the strarts of
the Bosporus u'ould reduce the rrsks of
ecological disaster to the crty of Istan-
bul Srnce 1960, the number of ships
that pass through the Bosporus has tn-
creased by 150% and tonnage b1'
400%.
- 
securttv uould be guaranteed slnce
Turkcl'rs a member of NATO
122 Russra decrdcd to react to thc Turkrsh de-
crsron to restnct shipprng through thc Bosporus
rn 1994. by' srgnmg a pipeline constructlon
agrccment ruth Grccce and Bulgarra The prpc-
hne u'ould clrcumvcnt Turkel' (Burgas-Alexan-
droupohs) The port of Burgas (rn Buigarra) has
storagc for 600 000 tonncs of oil, u'hrle thc ca-
pacrtv of the port of Alcxandroupolts (rn Greece)
ls approxlmatelr 1 2 mrlhon tonnes Tankers can
be loadcd rn the Aegean Sca 8 krlometrcs off-
shore bv mcans of a hrghlv sophrstrcated and
ven'safe svstem (srmrlar to svstcms that exist rn
Nonrav and Canada). ri'hrch protects the cnvt-
ronment and minimises thc nsk of pollutron
123 Thc European Unton ts tnterested rn the
prolect. to thc cxtent that the Balkan area could
become a zonc of cooperation bctu'ccn East and
Wcst. thus pror rdrng European countries i,vith a
guaranteed supph' of orl Clcarly', complctron of
such a pro.;ect rvould bc of major Intercst to both
Greecc and Bulgana
V. The thrust of the foreign policy of the
countries of central Asis and the Caucasus
vis-ri-vis major foreign power interests
within the region
124 It has to be understood from the outset that
the future stabrlrtl' of the region rvrll depend on
the princrpal forcign powers involvcd there such
as the United States, Russra, Chrna, Turkey and
Iran. The grourng tnvolvement of American
companles in the region is a cause of concern to
thc Russians n'ho are constantly seekrng to re-
gain a dommant rnflucnce in a region where,
since the last century', thel' have consrdcred thel'
have a malor part to plal'.
125 President Yeltsrn and other Russian repre-
sentatives have used a variety' of expressions to
descnbe Russra's "spectal responsrbility" to-
u'ards thc countnes tn questton.
126. Thcre are, m fact, trvo Russtan views of
the regron, the first advanced by, Foreign Mtntstcr
Pnmakov u'ho. on 2l Jull' 1994. as the then
Head of thc KGB, srgned a sccret dtrecttve rvtth
the then Forcrgn Mtnrster. Andrci Kozl'rev. on
"protectrng Russran Federatton interests in the
Caspran Sea". on the grounds that Russia had to
marntarn its "sphcre of influence" tn the region
Mr Primakov regards otl as an essenttal instru-
ment rn marntarnrng such influence As far as
internatronal competttton over reglonal orl ts con-
cerncd. he holds that the polrtrckrng rnvolved
could be harmful to Russta's influencc rn the
rcglon
127 The second vrc\\ rs hcld bv Pnme Mrnister
Viktor Chernoml rdtn and otl rndustn' reprcsen-
tatlvcs. rvho regard Wcstern tnvolvemcnt tn oil
del'elopment rn the Caspran Sca as a verl' posi-
trve stcp and the means of acqurring advanced
technologl'
128 Thesc tu'o conlpctrng positrons are rc-
flected rn thc confltcttng stanccs urthrn thc Rus-
sian Gor.'crnment *rth regard to the Caucasus
and central Asta For example, the agreement
srgned rn Azerbat;an tn September 199'l u'ith thc
Russtan Lukorl compan)'. \\'as subsequentll'
denounced officrallv b1' the Russtan Foreign
Mrnrster. although an officral from thc Russtan
Encrgt' Mrnrstn' attcndcd the srgnrng ccrcmon\'
Hon'cver. the gencrallv acccpted trend in Russian
pohcv ls to strengthcn and consohdate tts post-
tion rn thc rcgron
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129 Some senror Russran public figures have
pubhcly stated that srnce Russia is thc herr of the
Sovret Union and as the latter burlt the entire oil
mfrastructure neccssary in thc countrles of the
Caucuses and central Asia, thel,have a debt to-
rvards it. Russia has pursued an aggresslve pol-
ic1' to ensure it has a share rn major oil agree-
ments (rt obtarned l0%o for Lukorl in Azerbarlan
and l5oh for Gazprom m the Kazakh agreement
on the Karachaganak field) In June 1994,
Kazakhstan openly, accuscd Russia of decreasing
the volume of Kazakh orl passrng through the
exrstrng prpehne to force Kazakhstan to give rn to
Russian polrtrcal and economrc demands.
130 It should be recalled in this connection that
Russra still has armed forces and./or milrtary
bases in most of the CIS member states of central
Asra and the Caucasus x'rth the erceptron of Az-
erbarlan and Uzbekrstan The conccsslons re-
centll,made to Russia at the CFE Trcaty Confer-
ence over forccs deplolment on the southern
flank have further strengthened its posrtron in the
reglon
l3l Hence Russra contrnues to emplol, tradi-
tronal polrtrco-mrlrtan'methods to cxert rts mflu-
ence through the conclusron of brlateral or multr-
lateral agrecments, rf necessan' actrng through
intemational bodres (such as the OSCE's Mrnsk
Group) Such agreements enable rl tnter aha to
estabhsh mrlrtan' bases and deplol' so-callcd
"peacekccping forccs'', or entcr rnto armaments
reductron processes It uses thc threat of mrlrtarv
action as a means of leverage in negotratrng con-
tracts concerned u'rth natural resources. evcn rf
therc rs nc\/er an)' open or officral mentron of rt
132 The prrncrpal concern of the Unrtcd States
rs to avord central Asra becoming erthcr a rcglon
that is destabrhscd and ravaged bv crvrl rvar.
u'here nuclear prohfcratron or radrcal Islamrst
movements arc rrfc. or the targct for Russian
ambrtrons Such rnstabrlrtl'u,ould also bc dam-
agrng to prospects for the conclusron and implc-
mentatron of contracts for the explortatron of nat-
ural rcsourccs. areas rn u'hrch Amencan com-
panres hopc to plav a leadrng rolc
133 The Unrted Statcs officralh' has thrcc
malor polrtrcal arms lvithrn thc regron Thc first
is to support the destrc for rndcpendence and
sovercrgntv of the countncs of the regron The
Unrtcd States rs partrcularly' rnterested tn thc orl
rcsourccs of ccrtarn countnes such as Azcrbarjan
and Kazakhstan. These are the key to the
reglon's future development and could also be
the means of helping countries without such re-
sources such as Armcnia or Georgia. depending
on the suppll' routcs established
134 The second aim is to support US trade
interests as far as regional oil production and
export is concerncd. US companics could hasten
economrc rcforms and facilrtate thc region's entry'
to the rvorld economic market This commercral
presence u'ould strengthen US influence rn the
region The Unrted States hopes furthermore that
oil agreemcnts x,ill prove profitablc
135 Its third arm rs to diversrfr, rts oil supplics
and reduce its dependence on the Persran Gulf
Drversrficatron rvrll also be necessary to kecp up
u'rth an ever-increasrng rvorld demand for oil
products The margrn betq'een supplv and de-
mand rs becomrng steadrll, narro\\,er, ou,ing to
the fact that a number of u'ells are dn'rng up Orl
from the Caspran Sca u,rll have no rmpact on this
trend before 2005
136 The Unitcd States' drfficultl' rs to find a
compromlse betrrcen lts cornmercral rnterests and
rts foreign pohcl' uhrch arms to contaln Iraq and
Iran, encourage cconomrc and polrtrcal reform rn
Russta. Icnd support for thc settlement of re-
gronal conflrcts (Nagorno-Karabakh. Chechnl,a,'
Georgra) and maintain good relations x'rth Tur-
k.)' Raprd development of orl pro.;ects is csscn-
tial to thcsc countnes nhose cconomres are strll
very dcpendent on Russra
137 The Unrted Statcs' orl pohcv rn the rcgron
rehes on four marn props
(t) Actn,e drplomatrc support at all
lcvels. from cmbassv personncl up to thc
Presrdent of the Unrted States The Presr-
dent, Vrcc-Presrdcnt and several members
of the gor,crnment have takcn actrve steps
ln pursurt of American arms at a number
of meetrngs held ri,ith the ori countrres
Thc Unrtcd States has taken a spccial
intcrest in the Tengrzchcvrorl pro;cct in
Kazakhstan. Azerbar.yan's rnternatronal
petrolcum consortrum and rn the problcnrs
rclatrng to border demarcatron on the Cas-
pran Sea. Amerrcan reprcscntatlves nlaln-
tain srgnrficant lcvcls of contact u,rth
rcprcsentatrves of therr petroleum com-
panlcs to coordrnatc strategles to promotc
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their natronal commercial mterests. It
u'ould appear that President Clinton's
talks u'ith the Azeri President, Mr Aliyev,
in October 1997 madc a decisive con-
tnbution to the conclusion of the agree-
ment defining the northcm and western
routes for early exports. Vice-President
Gore also played a hrghll' acttve part in
promoting American oil policl, in the
region through contacts urth regional
leaders and talks rvrth Mr Chernomyrdin.
(ir) Exchanges betu'een governments and
commercial organisations. Thcse include
the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion, the US Department of Tradc, the Ex-
port-Import Bank and the Trade and De-
velopment Ageno, These organrsations
are alreadl' rnvolved rn projects or are
tn,rng to find rvavs of setting up projccts
more rapidly and efficiently.
ftit) Teclnical assrstance to help these
countnes del'elop therr commercial rnfra-
structure and legal systems and to facih-
tate development of their oil sectors and
othcr crport rndustries
(rv/ Support for effiorts made bv rnter-
natronal financral institutrons to strengthen
their rnfrastructure policics
138 The Unrted Statcs has estabhshed several
parameters to support thrs policl' These include
the establishmcnt of a number of short- and
medrum-term supplv routes The Unrted States
has encouraged this pohcy' srnce 199.1. bccause rt
crcatcs trade competrtron and guarantccs a con-
trnuous flou of encrgv supphes b), avording
dependcnce on a srngle routc
139 Among those envrsaged. the Unrted States
favours the route u'hrch ri,ould cross Turkcr'.
Thrs riould lncrease total orl cxport capacrtv
from the Caspran Sea u'hrle rchevrng current
pressure on thc Russran prpehnc system. Thc
Caspian Sca countries' dcpendcnce on Russia
w'ould thus bc reduced and thc argument in fav-
our of burlding a prpeline to the .Persran Gulf
through Iran u'ould lose rts forcc Thc United
States rs also opposed to pro.;ects u,hrch ivould
gi'r'c Iran anv polrtrcal. material or economic ad-
vantagcs and has cncouraged thc Caspian Sea
states to rnvolve Iran as a little as possiblc rn orl
pro.;Ccts Hou'ever, rt u'ould seem that US policr'
in this respect is not alu'ay's consistent. For
instancc, on 25 July 1997, the White House
announced that it was no longer opposed to a
pipehnc carrying natural gas from Turkmenistan
to Turkel,na Iran''. But i'et, u'hen Kazakhstan
signed a major oil contract on 19 November
1997 in Washrngton u'ith a consortium com-
pnsing four companies, Presidcnt Clinton used
the opportunttv to strongl-v- advtsc the President
of Kazakhstan, Mr Nazarbaev, not to route the
oilthrough Iranl8
140 As far as rcgronal securttl- ls concemed,
the United States, through its Dcfence Depart-
ment. supports the dcvelopment of regional arm-
ed forces. It hopes, by sctting up military trainrng
programmes, to induce thc forces of the countrtes
in question to break rvith the tradrtrons of the
former Sovrct armv Recent tntttattves, such as
the srgnature b1' Dcfencc Secretan' Wrlliam
Perrl of an agrecmcnt giving Kazakhstan
US$ 37 mrlhon ri'orth of loans for defence indus-
try reconvcrsion (in partrcular for upgradrng
equrpment at the Stepnogorsk chemrcal rvorks)
also come undcr thrs headrng. Inl'olvcment in thc
NATO Partncrshrp for Peace programme rvtll
also offer thesc countnes an alternattve to Rus-
sran ard The Unrtcd States could rnvolve ttself
more u'rdelv rn rcgronal development ri'ithrn the
framcu,ork of rnternatronal organrsatrons such as
the OSCE or the Unrted Natrons It rs currentlv
rnvolved in envrronmcntal protectton progralnmes
and programmes to combat arms prohfcration.
thc sprcad of drugs and organtsed crtme
l4l Chrna rs not prcdrsposed to drrect rnter-
ventron rn thrs rcgron. except as rcgards the
problcm of the U1'gur mrnontv In Xinliang
provrnce It has developed cconomrc and tradrng
relatrons urth Kazakhstan and Kirghrzrstan. and
the Caspran Sca area could. rn the long run. be-
come a suppher of resourccs to Chrna. u rth
natural gas from Turkmentstan and otl from
Kazakhstan It rs rn Chrna's lntcrcsts for thcsc
countries not to drau' too closc to Russtan and
Western markets Furthermore Chtna rs offering
rnfrastructure that is attracttle to ccntral Asia A
nov railu'av hnc. completed rn Junc 1992. hnks
Alma-Ata urth Urumqr and Urumqr srth Shang-
har. ovcr a drstance of 3 000 km October 1990
lt I.ronkfttrter.,lllgenrctne Zettuttg,2l August 19971" Lc \,lontle. 2l November 1997. Frunkfurler
-,lllgentctne Zergung,20 Nor ember 1997
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sa\\' the opening of thc Trans-Eurasran railu'ay'
hne across central Asra. leading to large-scale
movements of people, goods and currencies
China considers that economic development is
the best rva1, of limiting ethnrc conflrct in the
future. For this rcason it has undcrtaken a senes
of reforms u'rth a vieu' to rapid development of
the economl' of Xrnjrang and hence that of cen-
tral Asia as a rvhole. ln 1992. Bc4ing grantcd
Urumqi, the capital of Xrnliang province, prefer-
entral trading rights on a par wrth those of thc
coastal regions
142 Chrna is concerned at the unrest rn TaSrki-
stan and in the Ferghana Valler', next door to rts
Muslim regions, u,hich rt fears could sprll over
the borders into the country The u'av in u'hrch
China soh'es the problcms m thrs regron u'rll de-
termrne its future relatrons x'rth its regional n-
vals. the Middle East and south-cast Asia Sta-
bilitv in central Asra is essentral for its economrc
dcvelopment. Indced. Chrna has become an im-
porter of crude orl and urll be importrng an estr-
mated 100 mrlhon barrels around 2010. unless rt
finds nerv resources If rt is ablc to burld an orl
prpehne. the central Asran regron uill take on
considerable rmportance for Chrna rn the nert
centun'
143 Russra has started negotratrons u'rth Chrna
and the tu'o countrres hal,c srgned arms reductron
agreements. Therr relatrons have devclopcd cs-
sentrallv due to Russian arms sales to Chrna, thc
total value of u'hich cxceeded US$ 2 5 brlhon
betu'cen 1992 and 1994
141 In 1992 Russra and Chrna agreed to speed
up ncgotlatlons on the borders u'rth Kazakhstan.
Krrghrzstan and Ta;rkrstan and erprcssed their
u'rlhngness to reach agreement on the \\.gstern
borders contcsted by China The tu'o countnes
decrded to estabhsh a zone of stabrlrtv rn border
areas bv reducing mrlrtan' forces, cqurpment and
actrvrtres therc up to a distancc of 100 km from
the border
145. On 26 Apnl 1996. an agrccment *'as con-
cluded ln Shanghar betu'ccn Russra. Chrna.
Kazakhstan. Krrghizstan and Uzbekrstan. urth a
vre\\ to reducrng the tensrons on thcrr cornmon
borders Thc srgnatorrcs plcdgcd to refrarn from
uslng or threatenrng to use forcc agarnst each
othcr (rncludrng bv bordcr guards) and from
scckrng a unrlatcral mrlrtan' advantage The
agrcement provrded for exchanges of informatron
on mrlrtarl'forces dcployed rn thc region and for
prror notification of cxercises to be pcrformed
close to borders Thc number of such exercises
uould be reduced and rnspections organrsed on a
recrprocal basrs. Thc Russian and Chinese
Presrdents also agreed to continuc negotiations
on militarl'force reductions m border areas.
146. On 24 Apni 1997. thc srgnatories of the
Shanghai agrccmcnt signed another agreement rn
Moscorv setting a cerling on land forces, tactical
air forces and arr defence forces deplol'ed rvrthrn
a band of 100 km on erther side of the border
betwecn Chrna and the former Soviet republics.
According to Russian mrlrtan, sources, the cerl-
rng \\'as fixed at a strcngth of 130 400 for land
forccs and 3 900 tanks for China, and at an
equn,alcnt level for Russia, Kazakhstan. Kir-
ghizstan and Taykistan together Thrs agrccmcnt
does not in fact reducc cnsting forces, since the
currgnt level of forces deploy'ed b1' the fir,e
countnes is lou'er than thc agreed ccrhng
147 Chrna rs not rn favour of a rcgional svstem
of collectrl'c secunt)'. u'hereas Russia does sup-
port such a s)'stem as a long-tcrm objective
Horvever Chrna and Russra do have a srmrlar
approach to rcgional securrtv In a.lornt declara-
tron both partlcs stressed the rmportance of brlat-
eral or rcgronal-le'r'el dralogue on securit), tssucs
and the need to strengthen cooperation in the ficld
of regronal securrt\. bv endeavourrng to achrcvc
consensus through rcgular consultatrons Thc
Russrans and Chrnese havc thc same short-term
interest. u.hrch ls to counter ethno-natronahst and
rehgrous ambitions rn thrs rcglon
148 During the Subcommrttee's talks rn AIma-
Ata. the Kazakh rcprcsentatrves assertcd that
Kazakhstan has good relatrons u'rth rts tu'o large
ncrghbours. Russra and Chrna Rclatrons urth
Chrna. ln partrcular, had rmprovcd and
Kazakhstan's rndepcndence \\'as not rn 
.yeopardy
It u'as confirmcd dunng the mcctrng at the Dc-
fcnce Mrnrstn that Kazakhstan has concludcd
several mrlrtan' cooperatlon agreements urth
Russia Hou'cvcr. the dcplovmcnt of Russran
troops on Kazakh territon,u'as sard to be hmrtcd
to protectrng rentcd bascs such as the ono ln
Barkonur. uhrlc the borders of Kazakhstan \\,crc
defendcd exclusivelv b1' Kazakh forces. u'hrch
u'erc not. hou'cr.'er. rn"'oh'cd rn pcacckeeplng op-
eratlons rn Ta.;rkrstan
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149 The Deputl' Foreign Minrster of Kazakh-
stan strcssed among other things the rmportance
of marntarnrng a balance of intercsts m the
rcgion Rcgardrng relatrons rvith Chrna, he under-
scored thc importance of a treatl, that rvas
rccently concluded betrveen the two countries on
the transport of orl to Chrna and on construction
plans for a rarlu'ay that rs to cross China.
Kazakhstan is very much in favour of forced in-
tegration of the CIS and the Minister retterated
proposals for the creation of a Euro-Asian union.
u'hile acknou-ledgrng that mutual trust among
CIS member states had not reached a sufficient
level. In particular he u'elcomed the political
union agreed betu'een Russia and Belarus, rvith-
out shon'ing very much concem for human rights
violatrons rn the latter
150 Regarding the Tashkent Treaty develop-
ments. the Deputy' Mrnrster felt that the Treatl,
u'ouid not lead to a gcnuinc military alhance
since cach country had its orrm sy'stem of dcfence
and mrlrtan' doctnne and that it could not jeop-
ardrse the rndepcndcncc of Kazakhstan Thc
countn' u'as partrcrpating in peacekeeping efforts
under LN ausprces bv allocating forccs to the
central Asran battahon for peacekceping opera-
tions. It u'as aiso rvorkmg rn close cooperation
mth the Partnershrp for Peace institutions and
drd not see NATO enlargement as a threat.
15 I Horvever. it must not upset the inter-
natronal balance NATO should take Russian
mterests lnto account, slnce destabilisatron of
Russra ri'ould rn turn destabihse Kazakhstan
From thrs pornt of vreu'. Kazakhstan u'elcomcd
the terms of the NATO-Russra Foundmg Act
Generallr' speakrng. Kazakhstan \\'as anxlous to
plar a role rn coopcratron at rnternational lcvcl,
but also rn an OSCE frameu'ork Kazakhstan's
lnterests u'cre drrected tou'ards Europc and rt
sau'rtself as a brrdge betu'een Asra and Europc
152 Accordrng to other sources. the Prcsidcnt
of Kazakhstan \\'as drsapporntcd u'ith rvhat he
consrdercd to be rnsufficrent efforts to strengthen
the CIS, and he purportedll crttlctsed President
Yeltsin on that pornt Regardrng relattons lrrth
the European Unron. rt had srgned a coopcratton
agreement u rth Kazakhstan, but grven the lack of
a true CFSP. there s'as no colnmon European
pohcv us-a-r'rs thrs countn'
l-53 Turkev for rts part s,ould hkc to play a
leadrng rolc vts-a-vrs the Turkrsh-speakrng
pcoplcs rn thrs reglon Hort.ever, rts efforts to
exert cconomtc tnfluence rn these countries con-
flrct rvith Russtan and Irantan ambitrons due to
dcepll'-rooted historical rn'aln u'rth those coun-
tries Turkcy' rs a bndgc offering alternativc
trading and economic routcs from the Caucasus
and central Asia to the West. thcreby' obvtatrng
thc need to pass through Russta or Iran Russia
vrervs it as a geopolrtrcal rival and as a potential
threat as a bastion of the West or of Islam.
154 In spite of their nvaln' the tu'o countries
refrain from interfenng rn the internal affairs of
the other (Chechnr a. Kurds). as it is not in their
interest to encourage separatist movemcnts.
Moreover pnvate economic interests are creating
neu, ties behi'een them Turkel' u'as the first
NATO countr)' to reccive dehveries of Russian
armamcnts
155. Relations bctu'een Turkel' and "Chnsttan"
Gcorgia are exccllent. Indccd. stnce the blockade
agarnst lraq, Turkev has been looking for nov
markets to offsct rts cconomlc losses and has
thus become Georgra's matn tradtng partncr.
Moreover Georgra. kecn on the emergence of a
geopolitical force to provrde a countenvorght in
thrs regron. rs tn favour of an alltance urth Tur-
key' and Azerbaryan. strcngthened by' the loint
prolect for the construction of orl prpehnes link-
mg the Caspran Sea rvith the West. Azerbaijan
appears to be an unofficial a111' of Turkey, par-
trcularlv smce the latter. for historical reasons
dating back to the first u'orld rvar, has poor
relations u'tth Armcnta u'htch is currentlf in-
voh'ed rn a conflrct u'rth Azerbar.;an over the
Nagorno-Karabakh regron
l-i6 Turkcr"s relatrons urth the Turkrsh-spcak-
rng countnes of the Caspran Sca regron divindlcd
dunng the penod of Sol'rct rulc. but stncc thc
collapse of the Sovrct Unron. rt has been cndeav-
ourrng to rcvrvc rts hnks utth thcsc countrtes and
srncc I99l has concludcd a numbcr of political,
economrc and mrlrtan' agrccments rvith them
Srnce the fall of the opcnlv pro-Turkrsh Azcn
Presrdcnt Elchrber . u hrch somc people claim u'as
orchestrated bv Russta due to tts fears of an Az-
eri-Turkrsh rapproclrcrnenr. Turkel' has been
concerned about Russra's stance and has been
msrstmg on thc need for the countnes of the re-
gron to reduce therr dcpendence on Russia. in
partrcular as regards the route for their otl ex-
ports
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157. Turkcy,'s objectivc bcing to extend its in-
flucnce m the regron, rt has a particular interest
in the construction of a pipeline to convey oil
from the Caspran Sea to rts ou,n territory, as u'cll
as rn the financial benefits andjobs that rvould be
generated by, such a project. The conflict rvrth
the Kurds might hou'ever be an impedimcnt,
since it affects the region through rvhich the
prpeline rvould transit The oil pipeline projects
are confronted with another diffrculty, rvhich is
that oil from Azerbarjan and/or Kazakhstan
u,ould necessarrh' have to pass through Iran
and./or Armerua and Georgra before reachrng
Turkey'. None of these routes is particularly se-
cure since they' must cross zones of political in-
stability.
158 Iran's oblectives rn thrs region are of a
drfferent nature. Its arm is to extend rts political
rnfluence, establish profitable cconomlc and
tradrng relailons and to acqulre Sovrct milrtary
cquipment as rvell as nuclear cquipmcnt It as-
prres to the role of regronal leader. Iranran
Presrdent Hoshemr Rafsanlani often refers to thc
region of the Caucasus and central Asra as a
"centre for economrc exchanges" The reglon's
neu-lv discovered orl reserves are of consrderable
rnterest to Iran u'hose oun natural resources are
being depleted
159 Iranran representatrves, religious leaders
and businessmen have visrted all the countnes of
the region and estabhshed ties ri'ith the ne\\.gov-
ernments and their peoples Iran has broadened
lts economrc contacts and estabhshed neu' joint
vcntures. partrcularlv rn the field of orl and natu-
ral gas It has partrcularlv close rclatrons urth
Turkmenistan, u'hich rs a cause of conccrn for
Uzbekrstan and Kazakhstan, due rn particular to
thc armcd support that Iran provrdcs to the op-
posrtron in Ta.Jrkrstan Other countrres of thc
rcglon havc hnks u'rth Iran to countcrbalancc
thcrr relatrons u'rth Russra and Turkel,
160. Iran docs not seem rntent on imposing rts
model of socretv on the other countries of the
regron It estabhshes cultural and economic hnks
u'rth them, as is usual among neighbourrng
countrres. but its relatrons urth them are reahstrc
and pragmatrc Iran has verl' close tres urth rts
nerghbour Turkmenistan, despite the fact that the
latter is a Turkrsh-speakrng and Sunnite countn'
Its relatrons u'rth these countrres focus essentialll'
on energ), resources and therr transport. Iran
offers to these countrics a corridor providrng ac-
cess to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean
and has created free trade areas all along rts
northern border It has burlt a rail link from the
port of Bandar Abbas, on the Persian Gulf, to
Bafq, and an extension from Mashhad. to
Sarakhs, therebv hnking the country u'ith Turk-
menrstan An Iranran private companf is rn
charge of a prolect for the constructron of a
I 100 km rarl link from the port of Chah Bahar
to Sarakhs.
16l. Iran's relations x'ith Azerbaijan are deli-
cate, the latter havrng bow,ed to pressure from the
United States to refuse Iranian participation in
the international Azen orl consortium. Further
problems are the terrrtorial claims of the hvo
countnes and Iran's good relatlons u.ith Arme-
nla. Iran has established contacts ri-ith Turk-
menistan, urth a vien to examining rarlri,ay and
pipchne construction pro.;ects for the export of
natural gas from Turkmenrstan
162 Regardrng thc role of Uzbekrstan rn thc
regron of central Asra. rts pohc1, differs on a
number of rmportant pornts from that of its
nerghbour Kazakhstan Dunng the Subcommrt-
tee's visrt to Tashkent. the Vice-Charrman of the
Uzbek Parhament's Defence Commrttee u,as at
pains to pornt out that Uzbekrstan rvas not part of
an1'militan'bloc desprte being a signatorl. of the
Tashkent Treatl' Uzbekistan u'ould be prepared
to make forces avarlable to the UN if rt rvere to
decrde to mount a peacckeeping operation m the
region. Thus rt is a contrrbutor to the peace-
keeprng force composed of Uzbek, Kazakh and
Krrghrz unrts
163 Uzbekrstan rs consrdcred to bc thc most
rmportant po\\'er rn thc region and Prcsrdcnt
Kanmov rs cndcavourrng to burld up a strong
statc rn thc tradrtron of the cmplre crcated bt,
Tamburlarnc dunng thc l4th and l5th centurrcs
It refuses to rntroducc market economv pnncrples
usrng shock therapr and rnstcad advocates thc
"Uzbek u'ar"'u'hrch re.;ccts abandonrng statc res-
ponsrbrlrtrcs ln man\ scctors of the Uzbek ccon-
om)'
16.l Although Uzbekrstan stril tcnds to \\'ant to
settle all its rnternal problems u'ithout placing
sufficrent emphasrs on the devclopment of a free
socletv takrng control of a number of rts prob-
lcms and on the establrshment of a market econ-
omr', rt u'ould seem that Prcsrdent Kanmov's
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policl, has produced some good results and the
country can no\l, be considered as an rmportant
factor for stability in the regron It is also a bas-
tion against the influence of radical Islam
165 Nevertheless, Uzbekistan fears that it
might bccome marginalised because of its
position betrveen the ma;or po\\'ers of the region,
notabll, Russra and lran. Relations u'ith Turk-
menlstan are not eas1, given the authoritarianism
of the tu'o Presrdents and relations behveen
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are those of two
rival states rvhich nonetheless have in common
the desire to remain independent vis-ir-vis major
forergn powers
166 ln vierv of the constructive role it is play-
ing to strengthen regional stabrlrty and find fair
solutions to the conflicts raging in Afghanistan
and Tajikistan, Uzbekrstan deserves politrcal
support and increased material asststancc from
the European institutions.
167 As regards Azerbarjan's pohcv torvards
the Commonrvealth of Independent States (CIS),
it considers thcm to be a useful medtum for eco-
nomlc but not polrtical rntegration. It rs opposed
to all attempts to transform the CIS rnto a com-
munrtl, resembhng the former Sovtet Union All
the Azeri contacts the Subcommrttee met said
their country s'as determined to drarv as close as
possrblc to the Europcan tnstttutions
168 Accordrng to the Azen Defence Mtnister,
Russia had not grven up its imperialist ambrtions
in the Caucasus Azeri armed forces had been rn
a ven' drffrcult sttuatton since the defeat they had
suffered at the hands of the Armcntans rvhereas
Armenia was recelvlng arrns supphes from Rus-
sra Europe, and WEU in partrcular. contrtbute
to efforts to find a peaceful solutton to the prob-
lem of Nagorno-Karabakh and should help Azcr-
barlan to reburld tts armed forces The Mrnrstcr
thought the CIS could not sun'rve vcn' much
longer rn rts current state and might even col-
lapse
169 Azerbarlan therefore sa\\' no contradtctton
bet*'een membershrp of the CIS and the pre-
cautrons rt had to takc to defend rtself against an1'
Russran ambitrons The Forergn Mtntster regret-
ted that WEU rvas the onlv European organisa-
tron uith rthrch Azerba4an had becn unable to
estabhsh officral relattons and consrdcred this
partrcularlr' \\.orn'lng rn vlcw of thc fact that
Armenia had concluded a mrlitary alhance wrth
Russia. Armenia had milrtary bases m Georgia.
and Russia and Iran were closing ranks around
Azerbarjan. The latter had joined the CIS to
safeguard, not lose, its independence Had it rc-
mained outside, it ii'ould have been totally rso-
lated. Unfortunatell', neither the OSCE nor
NATO scemed to have understood the drfficult
position of Azerbar.yan, u'hrch could not simply
walk out of the CIS. Closer relattons betrveen
Azerbar.;an and WEU, even a special status,
would be very much apprecrated. The country
needed collectivc assistance, among other thrngs
to modernise its milrtarv equipment.
170 Accordrng to President Aliyev's special
adviser. rt \\'as drffrcult to foresee how relations
rvrth Russia u'ould develop stnce thc country rvas
still in a transitional phase Azerbatyan rvould
verl'much like to develop close coopcration rvtth
the United States and sincerely hoped that the
latter u'ould repeal legislation rcstrictrng eco-
nomrc ard to it, follourng the conflict in Na-
gorno-Karabakh. Regarding the route of the orl
pipelincs. Azerbarlan rvas in favour of there be-
ing as many as possrble rn particular through
Armcnia Hou'cl'er. Azerbarlan u'as conl'inced
that Russra rvould not allou' a pipehne to cross
Armenian terntory
W. Wat rolefor Europe?
17 | The European countnes tnvolved in the
reglon generallv sharc thc samc poltttcal ob.;ec-
tl!'es as the Unrtcd States and havc consequcnth'
drarvn up polrtrcal. commerclal and ard pro-
grafirmes srmilar to the Amcrtcan programmes
for the reglon Hou'ever, strong compctrtron to
obtain shares in the consorttum explortrng the
resources of Azerbar.;an accentuates thc drffcrcnt
positrons adoptcd bv Western states Thcrc are
ma.;or drfferences betu'een the United States and
European countrles uhen it comes to the qucstton
of what attrtude should be taken vts-i-vis Iran
Somc rnternational organtsations. such as the
World Bank or the EBRD. could plav a brgger
rolc in the future of the regron The World Bank
has set up proJects dcsrgned to hclp some of the
countries around the Caspran Sca develop their
energ)' rnfrastructure and lcgal s1'stems. The
European Unton provtdcs thc Caucasus and cen-
tral Asra urth qurte constderable humanttarian
and technical ard but has not yet proposcd any
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assistance in the gas and orl sectors. While rt is,
however, currently stud;-rng the construction
proj ects for the Burgas -Alexandroupohs (Russia-
Greece-Bulgaria) orl pipehne, rt ri'ill have to
ri'eigh the advantages and disadvantages of all
the solutions and not support Just one project.
172 The European Union's main mvolvement
is rn the Traceca project rvhose purpose rs to es-
tablish rarl and sea links betrveen the Georgian
Black Sea coastline and central Asia. But u,hat
is mrssrng rn Europe is a coherent polrtical view'
of affairs. The European countries have no role
u'hatsoever in the strategic decisions concerning
encrgv mattersle. Horvever, a specialist at the
Wrssenschaft und Polnk foundatron rn Ebcn-
hausen has expressed the following vrerv2O
"In 1990, i.e at the earliest possible op-
portunrty, the European Unron drerv up the
basis for a treaty text m the form of thc
European Energy Chartcr (u'hich \\'as
signed in December l99l) covenng the
u,hole of Europc, the formcr Sovret Unron
and all other Western mdustrralised coun-
trles Its purposc rvas to cstabhsh a com-
mon codc of conduct for the cxplortation
of energy' resources and their transport.
thus provrdrng a legal guarantee for inves-
tors ln particular, but also to set environ-
mental standards.
Br 1994 an Energy, Charter Treatv had
been negotrated u'hose provisions make
thrs code of conduct bindrng on the signa-
tones under rnternational lau' Although
the Unrted States and Canada havc not
srgned this Treatr'. all the European coun-
trres and Sovret Unron successor states
have done so Hou.ever, thc ratrficatron
process rs strll under n'av and the Trcatv rs
not ),ct rn force
There rs cven,thrng to suggcst that the
European Unron and its member states.
u'hich have no polrtrcal countcr rnterests rn
thc regron. rirll push for the process to bc
compictcd and enhance its politrcal value
Aftcr all. rt docs nothrng less than replace
an cra of order bv drktat rvrth an cra in
u'hrch thc same rules apply'to even'onc '
te Lc 
-\lonrlc Drplonatrque, October 1997
2't I;rankfrtrter.ll!ge nretne Zettung,2t August 1997
173 A good number of WEU member countrics
are part of economic consortia rn thc rcgron and
WEU should be prepared both to support a pro-
cess that rvrll guarantee peace and stabrlrtl'
throughout thc arca, and make a brggcr contribu-
tion to the efforts being made to put an end to the
conflrcts that are contrnuing to threatcn peace in
thrs part of the u'orld
VII. Conclusions
174 The u'a1' the srtuation in central Asia and
the Caucasus u'ill dcvelop over the next few dec-
ades u,rll depend on a number of factors:
- 
first, the extent ofthe natural resources
in the reglon around the Caspian Sea
needs to be established ri'rth morc pre-
clsron compared urth those of othcr de-
velopment sites, for instance in thc
Persian Gult at the moment there are
strll too many discrepancles rn cxperts'
estrmates:
- 
second. everythrng must be donc to
prcvent all thc po\\'ers rnvolved rn the
reglon from cngaglng in cut-throat
competrtron to explort and export those
natural resources because, sooner or
later. thrs could lead to srtuatrons of
conflrct hable to escalate out ofcontrol
175 What needs to be done before any'thing
elsc rs to tntcnsrfr' the cfforts berng made to sta-
bihsc and consohdate the polrtical. economrc and
socrai srtuatron rn all the countnes of the rcglon
that cmerged after thc drsrntegratron of the Sovrct
Unron
176 Anv rnrtratrves desrgned to solve thc on-
gorng rcgronal conflrcts must bc stcppcd up and
measures taken to prcvcnt cnscs brcaklng out ln
zones u'hcre therc rs a nsk of cthnrc or rehgrous
confrontatron
I'17 Close attcntron must bc pard to der,,elop-
mcnts ln thc CIS and to Russra's rcactrons rn the
event of lt no longcr bcrng able to use the CIS to
re-estabhsh rts rnflucncc on rts southern flank,
partrcularlr rn ccntral Asra and the Caucasus It
rs thcrcfore rmportant that thrs part of the u,orld
should bccomc a rcgton of economrc coopcration
in r.lhrch all the rnterested countrlcs could takc
part and from u'hrch thev could all bcncfit
30
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178 It ivrll be necessarv for the Unrted Statcs
and Europe to conccrt thcrr pohcrcs torvards thc
countnes conccrned and put an end to a numbcr
of drfferences bcts'cen them, notably concerning
Iran
179 Europc should agree on a genulne corrlmon
pohcy tou'ards central Asra and the Caucasus
and. rvlth the assrstancc of WEU. makc prepara-
trons to prol'ide a spccrfic pcacekecprng contrr-
butron so that none of the pou'ers of the reglon
can pose a threat
3t
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APPENDIX
Contribution from Mr Akgali, co-Rapporteur
It has onlv been five or slx y,cars srncc thc
countries of central Asia and Azerbarlan proclarmcd
therr urdepcndence. After 70 1,ears under the Sor.ret
regrme. ii'hat thcy' hale aclueved both ur thc eco-
nomrc and socral fields cannot be underestrmated. It
is the common polio, of those countries to nd them-
selves of the former Sor.ret sl,stem and develop therr
relations with the West Thel'are accordingl,"- pre-
pared to align their constitutions and electoral sys-
tems u'ith the Westem model. The Constrtutional
Court is tryrng to establish democratrc urstitutions ur
order to guarantee human nghts
The President of Kazakhstan has summed up
these ambitions rn the follourng terms' 'We are
Europeans Part of our tcrritory hcs uthin thc bor-
dcrs ofEurope"
For thcsc countnes the challengc of transformrng
therr economres. u'luch rverc ntegrated u,rth the
former Sonct economv. rnto sclf-sufficrent s),stems
and transfcmng therr productron output drrectly to
the European market ls one that u'rll be ven'
dfficult to me€t. Hou'ever, thel'have the necessan,
politrcal u'rll to actucve tlus ob.;ectrve.
Through the CIS, the Russran Federatron u'ants
to mfluence the countnes of central Asra but not-
ruthstandrng tlus, the latter have managed rn part to
frec themselves from the pressure cxerted br'
Russra.
Kazakhstan. Turhnerustan, Uzbelastan and Az-
erbalan have opened therr nch orl. natural gas, gold
and other mmes for rnvcstment bv the West Thc
Wcstcm countncs and thc Russian Fedcratron havc
estabhshed a balancc for thc usc ofthese resourccs
Thc gol'cmments of thc ccntral Asra:r countncs are
gr\mg economrc prefcrencc to a llcc market ccon-
om\'. ln othcr u'ords. to the Wcst
The West. m lts lum. should shorv mterest m
d*'elopurg thc regron and help thcse countnes ur the
fields of rnformatlon technologv and investment
There are some factors that make for easrer
relatrons urth Europe and even Amenca. They arc
ven rmportant and should not be underestrmated rr
the context of the ccntral Asran countnes drarnng
closer to Europe
One of them is thc fact that Turlosh is spoken rn
four of the central Asran rcpubhcs and rn
Azerbarlan As a result there rs a special cultural
reiationshp behr'rcn thcse countnes and Turkcl'.
Ttus may, not onlv be ur the nterest of Turkel, but
also m the common urterest of the Westem coun-
tnes. The West should make the most of tlls rela-
tionshrp ur the social. econonuc and democratic
fields and rts countnes should become involved n
central fuia not as o\\ners but as parhrers.
The close relatrons Turkey enjoys uith Turkrsh-
speakmg countnes has resulted rn the adoption of
the Latrn alphabet rn Kazakhstan, Turhncrustan,
Uzbekrstan and Azerbar;an Tlus is very rnportant
as far as Europe is concemed Horvever, m ccntral
Asra there has been a great deal of controversy on
ttus sub.;cct and prcssure for the Arabrc alphabct to
replace thc Cvnlhc alphabct Were thc Arabrc
alphabet to be adoptcd m thcsc countncs, it rrould
be verl' drfficult to prevent thc socral and religrous
penetration of lran and Saud Arabia Use of the
Latrn alphabet rn the countnes concemed rull be a
ven' sigruficant factor rr estabhshrng Wcstem
democrahc mstltutlons based on human rights
Changurg over from the Crnllic to the Latur alpha-
bet is a ven expenslve process For Uzbekistan
alone. the cost rs estrmated to be some US$ 6-
7 brllion Gn'en that the crntral Asian countnes do
not hal'e the means to meet ths cost, the transrtron
process has been extcnded to cover ten years
Furancral support from the West for stationen.and
pnntmg costs. ctc rrould shorten that penod
Adoptron of the Latrn alphabct srll not only, help
fostcr relatrons tuth Turkel but urll also lcad to a
bottcr understandrng of ucstem Europcan larg-
uagcs
The utrnost attcntron should bc pard to the
sccular understandrng of Islam m central Asra and
Azcrbagan What Europe rs concemcd about rs the
sprcad of an Iraruan npe (Slurte) of Islam through-
out central Asra and Azerba4an The exrstence of an
understandrng of Islam bascd on tolerancc can eas-
rlv be understood ur both countnes. Even n Azer-
ba4an, uhere the mqontl'of people are Shlte, tlere
rs an understandmg of a secular state and a chmatc
of tolerance s thc norm ln Turkel', Azerbailan and
thc central Asran countnes. tolerance and real Islam
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exst side by side. Thc West needs to appreciate
tlus srtuation.
It is quite clcar that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
are prepared to counter any' rmpact from the confltct
ur Afghamstan that has its ongm ur rehgron.
The most rmportant factor preventrng central
Asia and Azerbalan from drau'ing closer to Europe
rs the conflrct with Armenia over Nagomo-Kara-
bakh. The Iraruan-Armenian-Russran axs rs ham-
penng the efforts of the central Asian countnes to
develop relations with the West.
A glance at a map of the region shows that the
most drrect road and shipping routes to ccntral Asia
pass tkough Armerua Keeprng them closcd
becausc of the Nagomo-Karabakh conflrct isolates
Azerbagan and central Asia from the u.orld. If therr
isolation @ntinues, thcl'uill have to look for part-
ners other than rr the West
The West should settle the Nagomo-Karabakh
conflict before rt escalates urto a clash betu'een
Christiars and Muslims. A substantial Russian
mrlitarl. presencc may forrc Azerbaijan. wluch
u,ould be helplcss m the event of a fierce confronta-
tion, urto defendrng rself after the marmer of Af-
ghaustan Moreol'er, thcre rs some speculation as
to the exstence of non-Azen groups among those
resisturg the Armeruan mvasion.
JJ
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